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Abstract
One approach towards basing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes on weak and credible as-
sumptions is to build “stronger” or more general schemes generically from “weaker” or more re-
stricted ones. One particular line of work in this context was initiated by Myers and shelat (FOCS
’09) and continued by Hohenberger, Lewko, and Waters (Eurocrypt ’12), who provide constructions
of multi-bit CCA-secure PKE from single-bit CCA-secure PKE.
It is well-known that encrypting each bit of a plaintext string independently is not CCA-secure—
the resulting scheme is malleable. We therefore investigate whether this malleability can be dealt
with using the conceptually simple approach of applying a suitable non-malleable code (Dziem-
bowski et al., ICS ’10) to the plaintext and subsequently encrypting the resulting codeword bit-
by-bit. We find that an attacker’s ability to ask multiple decryption queries requires that the
underlying code be continuously non-malleable (Faust et al., TCC ’14). Since, as we show, this
flavor of non-malleability can only be achieved if the code is allowed to “self-destruct,” the resulting
scheme inherits this property and therefore only achieves a weaker variant of CCA security.
We formalize this new notion of so-called self-destruct CCA security (SD-CCA) as CCA security
with the restriction that the decryption oracle stops working once the attacker submits an invalid
ciphertext. We first show that the above approach based on non-malleable codes yields a solution
to the problem of domain extension for SD-CCA-secure PKE, provided that the underlying code
is continuously non-malleable against a reduced form of bit-wise tampering. Then, we prove that
the code of Dziembowski et al. is actually already continuously non-malleable against (even full)
bit-wise tampering; this constitutes the first information-theoretically secure continuously non-
malleable code, a technical contribution that we believe is of independent interest. Compared to
the previous approaches to PKE domain extension, our scheme is more efficient and intuitive, at
the cost of not achieving full CCA security. Our result is also one of the first applications of
non-malleable codes in a context other than memory tampering.
∗Work done while author was as ETH Zurich.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme enables a sender A to send messages to a receiver B confi-
dentially if B can send a single message, the public key, to A authentically. A encrypts a message
with the public key and sends the ciphertext to B via a channel that could be authenticated or in-
secure, and B decrypts the received ciphertext using the private key. Following the seminal work
of Diffie and Hellman [21], the first formal definition of public-key encryption has been provided by
Goldwasser and Micali [31], and to date numerous instantiations of this concept have been proposed,
e.g., [49, 24, 16, 28, 32, 35, 50, 48], for different security properties and based on various different
computational assumptions.
One natural approach towards developing public-key encryption schemes based on weak and credi-
ble assumptions is to build “stronger” or more general schemes generically from “weaker” or less general
ones. While the “holy grail”—generically building a chosen-ciphertext secure scheme based on any
chosen-plaintext secure one—has so far remained out of reach, and despite negative results [30], vari-
ous interesting positive results have been shown. For instance, Cramer et al. [15] build bounded-query
chosen-ciphertext secure schemes from chosen-plaintext secure ones, Choi et al. [10] non-malleable
schemes from chosen-plaintext secure ones, and Lin and Tessaro [37] show how the security of weakly
chosen-ciphertext secure schemes can be amplified. A line of work started by Myers, Sergi, and she-
lat [46] and continued by Dachman-Soled [17] shows how to obtain chosen-ciphertext secure schemes
from plaintext-aware ones. Most relevant for our work, however, are the results of Myers and shelat [47]
and Hohenberger, Lewko, and Waters [33], which generically build a multi-bit chosen-ciphertext secure
scheme from a single-bit chosen-ciphertext secure one.
A na¨ıve attempt at solving this problem would be to encrypt each bit mi of a plaintext m =
m1 · · ·mk under an independent public key pki of the single-bit scheme. Unfortunately, this simple
approach does not yield chosen-ciphertext security. The reason is that the above scheme is malleable:
given a ciphertext e = (e1, . . . , ek), where ei is an encryption of mi, an attacker can generate a new
ciphertext e′ 6= e that decrypts to a related message, for instance by copying the first ciphertext
component e1 and replacing the other components by fresh encryptions of, say, 0.
The above malleability issue suggests the following natural “encode-then-encrypt-bit-by-bit” ap-
proach: first encode the message using a non-malleable code1 (a concept introduced by Dziembowski
et al. [23]) to protect its integrity, obtaining an n-bit codeword c = c1 · · · cn; then encrypt each bit ci
of the codeword using public key pki as in the na¨ıve protocol from above.
It turns out that non-malleable codes as introduced by [23] are not sufficient: Since they are
only secure against a single tampering, the security of the resulting scheme would only hold with
respect to a single decryption. Continuously non-malleable codes (Faust et al. [25]) allow us to extend
this guarantee to multiple decryptions. However, such codes “self-destruct” once an attack has been
detected, and, therefore, so must any PKE scheme built on top of them. This is a restriction that we
prove to be unavoidable for this approach based on non-malleable codes.
The resulting scheme achieves a notion weaker than full CCA, which we term self-destruct chosen-
ciphertext security (SD-CCA). Roughly, SD-CCA security is CCA security with the twist that the
decryption oracle stops working once the adversary submits an invalid ciphertext.
Our paper consists of two main parts: First, we prove that the above approach allows to build
multi-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE from single-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE, provided that the underlying
code is continuously non-malleable against a reduced form of bit-wise tampering. This proof is greatly
facilitated by rephrasing the problem using the paradigm of constructive cryptography [39], since it
follows almost immediately from the composition theorem. For comparison we also provide a purely
game-based proof. Second, we show that a simplified variant of the code by Dziembowski et al. [23] is
already continuously non-malleable against the aforementioned reduced bit-wise tampering and that
1Roughly, a code is non-malleable w.r.t. a function class F if the message obtained by decoding a codeword modified
via a function in F is either the original message or a completely unrelated value.
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the full variant of said code achieves continuous non-malleability against full bit-wise tampering. This
constitutes the first information-theoretically secure continuously non-malleable code, a contribution
that we believe is of independent interest, and forms the technical core of this paper.
1.2 Techniques and Contributions
Constructive cryptography [39]. Security statements for cryptographic schemes can be stated
as constructions of a “stronger” or more useful desired resource from a “weaker” or more restricted
assumed one. Two such construction steps can be composed, i.e., if a protocol pi constructs a resource
S from an assumed resource R, denoted by R
pi
==⇒ S, and, additionally, a protocol ψ assumes
resource S and constructs a resource T , then the composition theorem of constructive cryptography
(see Appendix A) states that the composed protocol, denoted ψ◦pi, constructs resource T from R. The
resources considered in this work are different types of communication channels between two parties A
and B; a channel is a resource that involves three entities: the sender, the receiver, and a (potential)
attacker E.
We use and extend the notation by [43], denoting different types of channels by different arrow
symbols. A confidential channel (later denoted −→•) hides the messages sent by A from the attacker
E but potentially allows her to inject independent messages; an authenticated channel (later denoted
•−→) is dual to the confidential channel in that it potentially leaks the message to the attacker but
prevents modifications and injections; an insecure channel (later denoted − →) protects neither the
confidentiality nor the authenticity. In all cases, the double arrow head indicates that the channel
can be used to transmit multiple messages. A single arrow head, instead, means that channels are
single-use. All channels used within this work are described formally in Appendix B.
Warm-up: dealing with the malleability of the one-time pad. To illustrate the intuition
behind our approach, consider the following simple example: The one-time pad allows to encrypt an
n-bit message m using an n-bit shared key κ by computing the ciphertext e = m⊕ κ. If e is sent via
an insecure channel, an attacker can replace it by a different ciphertext e′, in which case the receiver
will compute m′ = e′⊕κ = m⊕(e⊕e′). This can be seen, as described in [42], as constructing from an
insecure channel and a shared secret n-bit key an “XOR-malleable” channel, denoted −−⊕→•, which
is confidential but allows the attacker to specify a mask δ ∈ {0, 1}n (= e ⊕ e′) to be XORed to the
transmitted message.
Non-malleable codes can be used to deal with the XOR-malleability. To transmit a k-bit message
m, we encode m with a (k, n)-bit non-malleable code, obtaining an n-bit codeword c, which we transmit
via the XOR-malleable channel −−⊕→•. Since by XORing a mask δ to a codeword transmitted via
−−⊕→• the attacker can influence the value of each bit of the codeword only independently, a code that
is non-malleable w.r.t. the function class Fbit, which (in particular) allows to either “keep” or “flip”
each bit of a codeword only individually, is sufficient. Indeed, the non-malleability of the code implies
that the decoded message will be either the original message or a completely unrelated value, which
is the same guarantee as formulated by the single-message confidential channel (denoted −→•), and
hence using the code, one achieves the construction
−−⊕→• ==⇒ −→•.
A more detailed treatment and a formalization of this example appears in Appendix C; suitable
non-malleable codes are described in [14, 23, 9].
Dealing with the malleability of multiple single-bit encryptions. Intuitively, CCA encryp-
tion guarantees that an attacker, by modifying a particular ciphertext, can either leave the message
contained therein intact or replace it by an independently created one. This intuition is formally
captured by the confidential channel −→•: at the attacker interface E, it allows to either forward
messages sent by A or to inject independent messages. In [12], it is shown how CCA-secure encryption
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can be used to construct a confidential channel −→• from A to B from an authenticated chan-
nel ←−• from B to A and an insecure channel − → from A to B. As shown in Section 3, this and
the composition theorem imply that using n independent single-bit PKE schemes, one can construct
n (independent) instances of the single-bit confidential channel
1-bit−→•, written [ 1-bit−→•]n.
The remaining step is showing how to achieve the construction[ 1-bit−→•]n ==⇒ k-bit−→• (1)
for some k > 1. Then, by the composition theorem, plugging these two steps together yields a
protocol m-pke that constructs a k-bit confidential channel from an authenticated channel and an
insecure channel.
To achieve construction (1), we use non-malleable codes. The fact that the channels are multiple-
use leads to two important differences to the one-time-pad example above: First, the attacker can
fabricate multiple codewords, which are then decoded. Second, each bit of such a codeword can be
created by combining any of the bits sent by A over the corresponding channel. These capabilities
can be formally captured by a particular class Fcopy of tampering functions. We prove in Section 3
that any code that is continuously non-malleable w.r.t. Fcopy can be used to achieve (1).
Unfortunately, we show in Appendix F that any code, in order to satisfy the above type of non-
malleability, has to “self-destruct” in the event of a decoding error. For the application in the setting
of public-key encryption, this means that the decryption algorithm of the receiver B also has to deny
processing any further ciphertext once the code self-destructs.
Self-destruct CCA security. In Section 3 we show how the protocol m-pke can be seen as a PKE
scheme that achieves self-destruct CCA security (SD-CCA) and show that the single-bit confidential
channel
1-bit−→• can also be constructed using a single-bit SD-CCA scheme (instead of a CCA-secure
one). Thus, overall we obtain a way to transform 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE into multi-bit SD-
CCA-secure PKE. For comparison we also provide a direct, entirely game-based proof that combining
a single-bit SD-CCA PKE scheme with a non-malleable code as above yields a multi-bit SD-CCA
scheme (see Appendix D).
SD-CCA is a (weaker) CCA variant that allows the scheme to self-destruct in case it detects
an invalid ciphertext. The standard CCA game can easily be extended to include the self-destruct
mode of the decryption: the decryption oracle keeps answering decryption queries as long as no invalid
ciphertext (i.e., a ciphertext upon which the decryption algorithm outputs an error symbol) is received;
after such an event occurs, no further decryption query is answered.
The guarantees of SD-CCA are perhaps best understood if compared to the q-bounded CCA notion
by [10]. While q-CCA allows an a priori determined number q of decryption queries, SD-CCA allows
an arbitrary number of valid decryption queries and one invalid query. From a practical viewpoint,
an attacker can efficiently violate the availability with a scheme of either notion. However, as long as
no invalid ciphertexts are received, an SD-CCA scheme can run indefinitely, whereas a q-CCA scheme
has to necessarily stop after q decryptions.
Subsequent work [13] shows that SD-CCA security can in fact be achieved from CPA security only,
by generalizing a technique by Choi et al. [10]. The resulting scheme, however, is considerably less
efficient than the one we provide in this paper. In [13], the authors also study the relation between
SD-CCA and other standard security notions and discuss possible applications.
Continuous non-malleability w.r.t. Fcopy. The class Fcopy can be seen as a multi-encoding version
of the function class Fset, which consists of functions that tamper with every bit of an encoding
individually and may either leave it unchanged or replace it by a fixed value. In Section 4 we build
a continuously non-malleable code w.r.t. Fcopy; the code consists of a linear error-correcting secret
sharing (LECSS) scheme and can be seen as a simplified version of the code in [23]. The security proof
of the code proceeds in two steps: First, we prove that it is continuously non-malleable w.r.t. Fset
against tampering with a single encoding; the main challenge in this proof is showing that by repeatedly
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tampering with an encoding, an attacker cannot infer (too much) useful information about it. Then,
we show that if a code is continuously non-malleable w.r.t. Fcopy against tampering with a single
encoding, then it is also adaptively continuously non-malleable w.r.t. Fcopy, i.e., against tampering
with many encodings simultaneously. In addition, in Appendix G, we also show that the full version
of the code by [23] is non-malleable against full bit-wise tampering (i.e., when additionally the tamper
function is allowed to flip bits of an encoding). These are the main technical contributions of this
work.
1.3 More Details on Related Work
The work of Hohenberger et al. [33]—building on the work of Myers and shelat [47]—describes a
multi-bit CCA-secure encrytion scheme from a single-bit CCA-secure one, a CPA-secure one, and a
1-query-bounded CCA-secure one. Their scheme is rather sophisticated and has a somewhat circular
structure, requiring a complex security proof. The public key is of the form pk = (pkin , pkA, pkB),
where the “inner” public key pkin is the public key of a DCCA secure PKE scheme, and the “outer”
public keys pkA and pkB are, respectively, the public key of a 1-bounded CCA and a CPA secure PKE
scheme. To encrypt a k-bit message m one first encrypts a tuple (rA, rB,m), using the “inner” public
key, obtaining a ciphertext ein , where rA and rB are thought as being the randomness for the “outer”
encryption scheme. Next, one has to encrypt ein under the “outer” public key pkA (resp. pkB) using
randomness rA (resp. rB) and thus obtaining a ciphertext eA (resp. eB). The output ciphertext is
e = (eA, eB).
To use the above scheme, we have to instantiate the DCCA, 1-bounded CCA and CPA components.
As argued in [33], all schemes can be instantiated using a single-bit CCA-secure PKE scheme yielding
a fully black-box construction of a multi-bit CCA-secure PKE from a single-bit CCA-secure PKE.
Let us denote with lp (resp., le) the bit-length of the public key (resp., the ciphertext) for the single-
bit CCA-secure PKE scheme. When we refer to the construction of [15] for the 1-bounded CCA
component, we get a public key of size roughly (3 + 16s) · lp for the public key and (k+ 2s) · 4s · l2e for
the ciphertext, for security parameter s.2
In contrast, our scheme instantiated with the information-theoretic LECSS scheme of [23] has a
ciphertext of length ≈ 5k · le and a public key of length k · lp. Note that the length of the public
key depends on the length of the message, as we need independent public keys for each encrypted bit
(whereas the DCCA scheme can use always the same public key). However, we observe that when k
is not too large, e.g. in case the PKE scheme is used as a key encapsulation mechanism, we would
have k ≈ s yielding public keys of comparable size. On the negative side, recall that our construction
needs to self-destruct in case an invalid ciphertext is processed, which is not required in [33], and thus
our construction only achieves SD-CCA security and not full-blown CCA security.
As shown in [12], the constructive security statement for public-key encryption corresponds to
replayable CCA security (RCCA), a notion proposed by Canetti et al. [6]. Hence, our scheme actually
achieves replayable self-destruct CCA security (SD-RCCA)—see Appendix D. We remark, however,
that if one is interested in SD-CCA security, this can be achieved generically from SD-RCCA security
using the transformation in [6].
Non-malleable codes. Beyond the constructions of [23, 9, 25], non-malleable codes exists against
block-wise tampering [11], against bit-wise tampering and permutations [5, 4], against split-state
tampering—both information-theoretic [22, 2, 7, 3, 1] and computational [38, 18]—and in a setting
where the computational complexity of the tampering functions is limited [8, 27, 34]. We stress
that the typical application of non-malleable codes is to protect cryptographic schemes against mem-
ory tampering (see, e.g., [29, 23, 19, 20]). A further application of non-malleable codes has been
shown by Agrawal et al. [4] (in concurrent and independent work). They show that one can obtain a
non-malleable multi-bit commitment scheme from a non-malleable single-bit commitment scheme by
2For simplicity, we assumed that the random strings rA, rB are computed by stretching the seed (of length s) of a
pseudo-random generator.
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encoding the value with a (specific) non-malleable code and then committing to the codeword bits.
Despite the similarity of the approaches, the techniques applied in their paper differ heavily from
ours. The class of tampering functions the code has to protect against is different, and we additionally
need continuous non-malleability to handle multiple decryption queries (this is not required for the
commitment case).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Systems: Resources and Converters, Distinguishers, and Reductions
Resources and converters. We use the concepts and terminology of abstract [41] and constructive
cryptography [39]. The resources we consider are different types of communication channels, which
are systems with three interfaces labeled by A, B, and E. A converter is a two-interface system
which is directed in that it has an inside and an outside interface. Converters model protocol engines
that are used by the parties, and using a protocol is modeled by connecting the party’s interface of
the resource to the inside interface of the converter (which hides those two interfaces) and using the
outside interface of the converter instead. We generally use upper-case, bold-face letters (e.g., R, S)
or channel symbols (e.g., •−→) to denote resources or single-interface systems and lower-case Greek
letters (e.g., α, β) or sans-serif fonts (e.g., enc, dec) for converters. We denote by Φ the set of all
resources and by Σ the set of all converters.
For I ∈ {A,B,E}, a resource R ∈ Φ, and a converter α ∈ Σ, the expression αIR denotes the
composite system obtained by connecting the inside interface of α to interface I of R; the outside
interface of α becomes the I-interface of the composite system. The system αIR is again a resource
(cf. Figure 2 on page 9). For two resources R and S, [R,S] denotes the parallel composition of R and
S. For each I ∈ {A,B,E}, the I-interfaces of R and S are merged and become the sub-interfaces of
the I-interface of [R,S].
Two converters α and β can be composed serially by connecting the inside interface of β to the
outside interface of α, written β ◦ α, with the effect that (β ◦ α)IR = βIαIR. Moreover, converters
can also be taken in parallel, denoted by [α, β], with the effect that [α, β]I [R,S] = [αIR, βIS]. We
assume the existence of an identity converter id ∈ Σ with idIR = R for all resources R ∈ Φ and
interfaces I ∈ {A,B,E} and of a special converter ⊥ ∈ Σ with an inactive outside interface.
Distinguishers. A distinguisher D connects to all interfaces of a resource U and outputs a sin-
gle bit at the end of its interaction with U. The expression DU defines a binary random variable
corresponding to the output of D when interacting with U, and the distinguishing advantage of a
distinguisher D on two systems U and V is defined as
∆D(U,V) := |P[DU = 1]− P[DV = 1]|.
The distinguishing advantage measures how much the output distribution of D differs when it is
connected to either U or V. Note that the distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric.3
Reductions. When relating two distinguishing problems, it is convenient to use a special type of
system C that translates one setting into the other. Formally, C is a converter that has an inside and
an outside interface. When it is connected to a system S, which is denoted by CS, the inside interface
of C connects to the (merged) interface(s) of S and the outside interface of C is the interface of the
composed system. C is called a reduction system (or simply reduction).
To reduce distinguishing two systems S,T to distinguishing two systems U,V, one exhibits a
reduction C such that CS ≡ U and CT ≡ V. Then, for all distinguishers D, we have ∆D(U,V) =
∆D(CS,CT) = ∆DC(S,T). The last equality follows from the fact that C can also be thought of as
being part of the distinguisher (which follows from the composition-order independence [41]).
3That is, for any D, it is symmetric, satisfies the triangle inequality, and ∆D(R,R) = 0 for all R.
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2.2 Discrete Systems
The behavior of systems can be formalized by random systems as in [45, 40]: A random system S is a
sequence (pS
Y i|Xi)i≥1 of conditional probability distributions, where p
S
Y i|Xi(y
i, xi) is the probability of
observing the outputs yi = (y1, . . . , yi) given the inputs x
i = (x1, . . . , xi). If for two systems R and S,
pRY i|Xi = p
S
Y i|Xi
for all i and for all parameters where both are defined, they are called equivalent, denoted by R ≡ S.
In that case, ∆D(R,S) = 0 for all distinguishers D.
A system S can be extended by a so-called monotone binary output (or MBO) B, which is an
additional one-bit output B1, B2, . . . with the property that Bi = 1 implies Bi+1 = 1 for all i.
4 The
enhanced system is denoted by Sˆ, and its behavior is described by the sequence (pSˆ
Y i,Bi|Xi)i≥1. If for
two systems Rˆ and Sˆ with MBOs,
pRˆY i,Bi=0|Xi = p
Sˆ
Y i,Bi=0|Xi
for all i, they are called game equivalent, which is denoted by Rˆ
g≡ Sˆ. In such a case, ∆D(R,S) ≤
ΓD(Rˆ) = ΓD(Sˆ), where ΓD(Rˆ) denotes the probability that D provokes the MBO. For more details
and a proof of this fact, consult [40].5
2.3 The Notion of Construction
We formalize the security of protocols via the notion of construction, introduced in [39]:
Definition 1. Let Φ and Σ be as above, and let ε1 and ε2 be two functions mapping each distin-
guisher D to a real number in [0, 1]. A protocol pi = (pi1, pi2) ∈ Σ2 constructs resource S ∈ Φ from
resource R ∈ Φ with distance (ε1, ε2) and with respect the simulator σ ∈ Σ, denoted6
R
pi,σ,(ε1,ε2)
==⇒ S,
if for all distinguishers D,{
∆D(pi1
Api2
B⊥ER,⊥ES) ≤ ε1(D) (availability)
∆D(pi1
Api2
BR, σES) ≤ ε2(D) (security).
The availability condition captures that a protocol must correctly implement the functionality of
the constructed resource in the absence of the attacker. The security condition models the requirement
that everything the attacker can achieve in the setting with the assumed resource and the protocol,
she can also accomplish in the setting with the constructed resource (using the simulator to translate
the behavior). The notion of construction composes; details can be found in Appendix A.
2.4 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme with message space M ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and ciphertext space E is
defined as three algorithms Π = (K,E,D), where the key-generation algorithm K outputs a key pair
(pk, sk), the (probabilistic) encryption algorithm E takes a message m ∈ M and a public key pk and
outputs a ciphertext e← Epk(m), and the decryption algorithm takes a ciphertext e ∈ E and a secret
key sk and outputs a plaintext m ← Dsk(e). The output of the decryption algorithm can be the
special symbol , indicating an invalid ciphertext. A PKE scheme is correct if m = Dsk(Epk(m)) (with
probability 1 over the randomness in the encryption algorithm) for all messages m and all key pairs
(pk, sk) generated by K.
We introduce security notions for PKE schemes as we need them.
4In other words, once the MBO is 1, it cannot return to 0.
5Intuitively, this means that in order to distinguish the two systems, D has to provoke the MBO.
6In less formal contexts, we sometimes drop the superscripts on ==⇒ .
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System SrealF
init
i← 0
on (encode, x)
i← i+ 1
c(i)←$ Enc(x)
on (tamper, f) with f ∈ F (i)
c′ ← f(c(1), . . . , c(i))
x′ ← Dec(c′)
if x′ = 
self-destruct
out x′
System SsimuF ,τ
init
i← 0
on (encode, x)
i← i+ 1
x(i)←$ x
on (tamper, f) with f ∈ F (i)
x′←$ τ(i, f)
if x′ = 
self-destruct
if x′ = (same, j)
x′ ← x(j)
out x′
Figure 1: Systems SrealF and S
simu
F,τ defining adaptive continuous non-malleability of (Enc,Dec). The
command self-destruct has the effect that  is output and all future queries are answered by .
2.5 Continuously Non-Malleable Codes
Non-malleable codes, introduced in [23], are coding schemes that protect the encoded messages against
certain classes of adversarially chosen modifications, in the sense that the decoding will result either
in the original message or in an unrelated value.
Definition 2 (Coding scheme). A (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) consists of a randomized encoding
function Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n and a deterministic decoding function Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {}
such that Dec(Enc(x)) = x (with probability 1 over the randomness of the encoding function) for each
x ∈ {0, 1}k. The special symbol  indicates an invalid codeword.
Basic non-malleable codes [23] provide the above guarantee in a context where the adversary is allowed
to modify a (random) codeword c (of a message of his choice) by specifying a function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n from a particular function class F and observe the output of the decoding algorithm applied
to the tampered codeword f(c).
Continuous non-malleability, introduced in [25], extends this guarantee to the case where the
adversary is allowed to perform multiple such modifications of a target codeword c. That is, he can
repeatedly and adaptively specify functions f ∈ F and see the decoding of the tampered codeword
f(c). The functions f specified by the adversary are always applied to the same c.
The notion of adaptive continuous non-malleability considered here is an extension of continuous
non-malleability in that the adversary is allowed to (adaptively) specify multiple messages x(1), x(2), . . .
and the functions may depend on all of the corresponding codewords c(1), c(2), . . .. That is, the class
F is actually a sequence (F (i))i≥1 of function families with F (i) ⊆ {f | f : ({0, 1}n)i → {0, 1}n}, and
after encoding i messages, the adversary chooses functions from F (i). A similar adaptive notion has
been already considered for continuous strong non-malleability in the split-state model [26].
Formally, adaptive continuous non-malleability w.r.t. F is defined by comparing the two random
systems SrealF and S
simu
F ,τ defined in Figure 1. Both systems process encode and tamper queries from a
distinguisher D, whose objective is to tell the two systems apart.
System SrealF produces a random encoding c
(i) of each message x(i) specified by D and allows D
to repeatedly issue tampering functions f ∈ F (i). For each such query, SrealF computes the modified
codeword c′ = f(c(1), . . . , c(i)) and outputs Dec(c′). Whenever Dec(c′) = , the system enters a
self-destruct mode, in which all further queries are replied to by .
The second random system, SsimuF ,τ , features a simulator τ , which is allowed to keep state. The
simulator repeatedly takes a tampering function and outputs either a message x′, (same, v) for v ∈
{1, . . . , i}, or , where (same, v) is used by τ to indicate that (it believes that) the tampering results in
an n-bit string that decodes to the vth message encoded. System SsimuF ,τ outputs whatever τ outputs,
except that (same, v) is replaced by the vth message x(v) specified by D. Moreover, in case of , SsimuF ,τ
self-destructs.
For `, q ∈ N, SrealF ,`,q is the system that behaves as SrealF except that only the first ` encode-queries
and the first q tamper-queries are handled (and similarly for SsimuF ,τ,`,q and S
simu
F ,τ ). Note that by setting
` = 1, one recovers continuous non-malleability as defined in [25],7 and by additionally setting q = 1
7Being based on strong non-malleability [23], the notion of [25] is actually stronger than ours.
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the original definition of non-malleability.
Definition 3 (Continuous non-malleability). Consider a sequence F = (F (i))i≥1 of function families
F (i) ⊆ {f | f : ({0, 1}n)i → {0, 1}n} and let `, q ∈ N. A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is adaptively
continuously (F , ε, `, q)-non-malleable (or simply (F , ε, `, q)-non-malleable) if there exists a simulator
τ such that ∆D(SrealF ,`,q,S
simu
F ,τ,`,q) ≤ ε for all distinguishers D.
3 From Single-Bit to Multi-Bit Channels
In this section we examine the question of domain extension for CCA-secure public-key encryption
(PKE) via the following intuitive non-malleable code based approach: first encode a k-bit message
using a non-malleable (k, n)-code to protect its integrity, obtaining an n-bit codeword c; then encrypt
c bit-wise using n independent public keys for a single-bit CCA-secure PKE. We observe that the
adversary’s ability of asking multiple decryption queries requires to opt for continuously non-malleable
codes. The self-destruct property of these codes, however, translates to the resulting PKE scheme,
and thus we achieve domain extension only for schemes with so-called self-destruct CCA security,
a variant of CCA security where the decryption oracle stops working after the attacker submits an
invalid ciphertext; this variant is defined more precisely in Section D.1.
We stress that the need for self-destruct is not a limitation of the security proof of our code (cf.
Section 4), as continuous non-malleability for the class of tampering functions required for the above
transformation to work is impossible without the self-destruct property (cf. Appendix F for details).
As shown below, phrasing PKE domain extension using the paradigm of constructive cryptography
allows to decompose the problem into two independent parts: The first part includes a (canonical)
reduction to the SD-CCA security of the single-bit PKE scheme, whereas the second part, which
involves non-malleable codes, is purely information-theoretic. The two parts can then be combined to
obtain a single protocol, whose security follows from the composition theorem. We also show how the
resulting protocol can be understood as a PKE scheme and that it achieves SD-CCA security.
All channel resources that appear in this section are formally defined in Section B of the appendix;
to understand the statements and explanations below, the informal descriptions given in Section 1.2
are sufficient, however.
3.1 Single-Bit PKE Viewed Constructively
Following the proof of [12, Theorem 2], one can show that a 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE scheme can
be used to design a protocol that achieves the construction
[←−•,− →] ==⇒ 1-bit−→•, (2)
where, in a nutshell, the receiver’s protocol converter is responsible for key generation, decryption, as
well as self-destructing, the sender’s protocol converter for encryption, and where the authenticated
channel ←−• is used for the transmission of the public key and the insecure channel − → for sending
ciphertexts. The constructed single-bit confidential channel
1-bit−→• hides all messages sent by the
sender from the attacker and allows the attacker to either deliver already sent messages or to inject
independent messages. This captures the intuitive (SD-)CCA guarantee that an attacker, by modifying
a particular ciphertext, can either leave the message contained therein intact or replace it by an
independently created one.
Using n independent copies of the single-bit scheme in parallel yields a protocol 1-pke that achieves:
[←−•,− →] 1-pke==⇒ [ 1-bit−→•]n, (3)
which follows almost directly from the composition theorem. More details can be found in Ap-
pendix D.2.
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1-bit−→•
1-bit−→•
...
1-bit−→•
encode decodeA B
E
A B
E
k-bit−→•
σ
Figure 2: Left: The assumed resource [
1-bit−→•]n with protocol converters encode and decode attached
to interfaces A and B, denoted encodeAdecodeB [
1-bit−→•]n. Right: The constructed resource k-bit−→• with
simulator σ attached to the E-interface, denoted σE
k-bit−→•. In particular, σ must simulate the E-
interfaces of [
1-bit−→•]n. The protocol is secure if the two systems are indistinguishable.
3.2 Tying the Channels Together
We now show how to construct, using an adaptive continuously non-malleable (k, n)-code (cf. Sec-
tion 2.5), a (single) k-bit confidential channel from the n independent single-bit confidential channels
constructed in the previous section. This is achieved by having the sender encode the message with
the non-malleable code and sending the resulting codeword over the 1-bit channels (bit-by-bit), while
the receiver decodes all n-bit strings received via these channels. Additionally, due to the self-destruct
property of continuously non-malleable codes, the receiver must stop decoding once an invalid code-
word has been received.
More precisely, let (Enc,Dec) be a (k, n)-coding scheme and consider the following protocol nmc =
(encode, decode): Converter encode encodes every message m ∈ {0, 1}k input at its outside interface
with fresh randomness, resulting in an n-bit encoding c = c1 · · · cn ← Enc(m). Then, for i = 1, . . . , n,
it outputs bit ci to the i
th channel at the inside interface. Converter decode, whenever it receives an n-
bit string c′ = c′1 · · · c′n (where the ith bit c′i was received on the ith channel), it computes m′ ← Dec(c′)
and outputs m′ at the outside interface. If m′ = , it implements the self-destruct mode, i.e., it
answers all future encodings received at the inside interface by outputting  at the outside interface.
The goal is now to show that protocol nmc achieves the construction
[
1-bit−→•]n nmc==⇒ k-bit−→• . (4)
The required non-malleability. By inspecting both sides of Figure 2, it becomes immediately
apparent why adaptive continuously non-malleable codes are the proper choice to achieve construc-
tion (4): On the left-hand side, the distinguisher can repeatedly input messages m(i) at interface
A, which results in encodings c(i) being input (bit-by-bit) into the single-bit channels. Using the
E-interfaces of these channels, the distinguisher can repeatedly see the decoding of an n-bit string
c′ = c′1 · · · c′n at interface B, where each bit c′j results from either forwarding one of the bits already in
the jth channel or from injecting a fresh bit that is either 0 or 1.
Put differently, the distinguisher can effectively launch tampering attacks using functions from
Fcopy := (F (i)copy)i≥1, where F (i)copy ⊆ {f | f : ({0, 1}n)i → {0, 1}n} and each function f ∈ F (i)copy is char-
acterized by a vector χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) where fj ∈ {zero, one, copy1, . . . , copyi}, with the meaning
that f takes as input i codewords (c(1), . . . , c(i)) and outputs an n-bit string c′ = c′1 · · · c′n in which
each bit c′j is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), or copied from the j
th bit in a codeword c(v) (copyv)
for v ∈ {1, . . . , i}.
On the right-hand side, the distinguisher may again input messages m(i) at interface A—to the k-
bit confidential channel. At interface E, this channel only allows to either deliver entire k-bit messages
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already sent by A or to inject independent messages. The simulator σ required to prove (4) needs
to simulate the E-interfaces of the single-bit confidential channels at its outside interface and, based
solely on what is input at these interfaces, decide whether to forward or inject a message, which
corresponds exactly to the task of the simulator τ in the non-malleability experiment (cf. Section 2.5).
Theorem 1 below formalizes this correspondence; its proof is essentially a technicality: one merely
needs to “translate” between the channel settings and the non-malleability experiment. For complete-
ness it is provided in full detail in Appendix D.3.
Theorem 1. For any `, q ∈ N, if (Enc,Dec) is (Fcopy, ε, `, q)-continuously non-malleable, there exists
a simulator σ such that
[
1-bit,`,q−→• ]n (nmc,σ,(0,ε))==⇒ k-bit,`,q−→• ,
where the additional superscripts `, q on a channel mean that it only processes the first ` queries at
the A-interface and only the first q queries at the E-interface.
3.3 Plugging It Together
The composition theorem of constructive cryptography (cf. Appendix A) implies that the protocol
m-pke = nmc ◦ 1-pke resulting from composing the protocols 1-pke and nmc for transformations (3)
and (4), respectively, achieves
[←−•,− →] m-pke==⇒ k-bit−→• . (5)
Protocol m-pke corresponds (in a straight-forward manner) to a PKE scheme Π that achieves SD-
CCA security, as shown in Section D.4 of the appendix.8 Hence, overall, we obtain a domain extension
technique for SD-CCA-secure PKE schemes.
Furthermore, in Section D.5, we also provide a direct game-based proof of the fact that combining
single-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE with a non-malleable code as shown above yields a multi-bit SD-
CCA-secure PKE scheme. That proof is a hybrid argument and is obtained by “unwrapping” the
concatenation of the statements in this section. The modular nature and the intuitive simplicity of
the proofs are lost, however.
4 Continuous Non-Malleability against Bit-Wise Tampering
In this section, we describe a code that is adaptively continuously non-malleable w.r.t. Fcopy. For
completeness, in Appendix G, we also provide a code secure w.r.t. to an extension F ′copy of Fcopy that
allows bit-flips as well.
The transition from continuous to adaptive continuous non-malleability w.r.t. Fcopy is achieved
generically:
Theorem 2. If a (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is continuously (Fcopy, ε, 1, q)-non-malleable, it is
also continuously (Fcopy, 2`ε+ q`2k , `, q)-non-malleable, for all `, q ∈ N.
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix E. It remains to construct a continuously non-
malleable code that is secure against tampering with a single encoding, which we do below.
Continuous non-malleability for single encoding. The code is based on a linear error-correcting
secret-sharing (LECSS). The use of a LECSS is inspired by the work of [23], who proposed a (non-
continuous) non-malleable code against bit-wise tampering based on a LECSS and, additionally, an
AMD-code (cf. Appendix G), where the AMD-code essentially handles bit-flips. As we do not need
to provide non-malleability against bit-flips, using only the LECSS is sufficient for our purposes. The
following definition is taken from [23]:9
8Actually, our protocol only achieves replayable SD-CCA security, which, however, is not a major issue as explained
in Section D.4.
9The operator ⊕ denotes the bit-wise XOR.
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Definition 4 (LECSS code). A (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is a (d, t)-linear error-correcting
secret-sharing (LECSS) code if the following properties hold:
• Linearity: For all c ∈ {0, 1}n such that Dec(c) 6= ⊥, all δ ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
Dec(c⊕ δ) =
{
⊥ if Dec(δ) = ⊥
Dec(c)⊕Dec(δ) otherwise.
• Distance d: For all c′ ∈ {0, 1}n with Hamming weight 0 < wH(c′) < d, we have Dec(c′) = ⊥.
• Secrecy t: For any fixed x ∈ {0, 1}k, the bits of Enc(x) are individually uniform and t-wise
independent (over the randomness in the encoding).
It turns out that a LECSS code is already continuously non-malleable with respect to Fcopy:
Theorem 3. Assume that (Enc,Dec) is a (t, d)-LECSS (k, n)-code for d > n/4 and d > t. Then
(Enc,Dec) is (Fcopy, ε, 1, q)-continuously non-malleable for all q ∈ N and
ε = 2−(t−1) +
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
.
For brevity, we write Fset for F (1)copy below, with the idea that the tampering functions in F (1)copy only
allow to keep a bit or to set it to 0 or to 1. More formally, a function f ∈ Fset can be characterized
by a vector χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) where fi ∈ {zero, one, keep}, with the meaning that f takes as input a
codeword c and outputs a codeword c′ = c′1 · · · c′n in which each bit is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1
(one), or left unchanged (keep).
For the proof of Theorem 3, fix q ∈ N and some distinguisher D. For the remainder of this
section, let F := Fset, SrealF := SrealF ,1,q and SsimuF ,τ := SsimuF ,τ,1,q (for a simulator τ to be determined). For
a tamper query f ∈ F with χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) issued by D, let A(f) := {i | fi ∈ {zero, one}},
B(f) := {i | fi ∈ {keep}}, and a(f) := |A(f)|. Moreover, let val(zero) := 0 and val(one) := 1. Queries
f with 0 ≤ a(f) ≤ t, t < a(f) < n − t, and n − t ≤ a(f) ≤ n are called low queries, middle queries,
and high queries, respectively.
Handling Middle Queries. Consider the hybrid system H that proceeds as SrealF , except that as
soon as D specifies a middle query f , H self-destructs, i.e., answers f and all subsequent queries by .
Lemma 4. ∆D(SrealF ,H) ≤ 12t +
(
t
n(d/n−1/4)2
)t/2
.
Proof. Define a successful middle query to be a middle query that does not decode to . On both
systems SrealF and H, one can define an MBO B (cf. Section 2.2) that is provoked if and only if the
first middle query is successful and the self-destruct has not been provoked up to that point.
Clearly, SrealF and H behave identically until MBO B is provoked, thus SˆrealF
g≡ Hˆ, and
∆D(SrealF ,H) ≤ ΓD(SˆrealF ).
Towards bounding ΓD(SˆrealF ), note first that adaptivity does not help in provoking B: For any
distinguisher D, there exists a non-adaptive distinguisher D′ with
ΓD(SˆrealF ) ≤ ΓD
′
(SˆrealF ). (6)
D′ proceeds as follows: First, it (internally) interacts with D only. Initially, it stores the message x
output by D internally. Whenever D outputs a low query, D′ answers with x. Whenever D outputs
a high query f = (f1, . . . , fn), D
′ checks whether there exists a codeword c∗ that agrees with f in
positions i where fi ∈ {zero, one}. If it exists, it answers with Dec(c∗), otherwise with . As soon as
D specifies a middle query, D′ stops its interaction with D and sends x and all the queries to SˆrealF .
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To prove (6), fix all randomness in experiment D′SrealF , i.e., the coins of D (inside D
′) and the
randomness of the encoding (inside SrealF ). Suppose D would provoke B in the direct interaction with
SrealF . In that case all the answers by D
′ are equal to the answers by SrealF . This is due to the fact
that the distance of the LECSS is d > t; a successful low query must therefore result in the original
message x and a successful high query in Dec(c∗). Thus, whenever D provokes B, D′ provokes it as
well.
It remains to analyze the success probability of non-adaptive distinguishers D′. Fix the coins of
D′; this determines the tamper queries. Suppose there is at least one middle case, as otherwise B is
trivially not provoked. The middle case’s success probability can be analyzed as in [23, Theorem 4.1],
which leads to
ΓD
′
(SˆrealF ) ≤
1
2t
+
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
(recall that the MBO cannot be provoked after an unsuccessful first middle query).
Simulator. The final step of the proof consists of exhibiting a simulator τ such that ∆D(H,SsimuF ,τ )
is small. The indistinguishability proof is facilitated by defining two hardly distinguishable systems
B and B′ and a wrapper system W such that WB ≡ H and WB′ ≡ SsimuF ,τ .
System B works as follows: Initially, it takes a value x ∈ {0, 1}k, computes an encoding c1 · · · cn←$
Enc(x) of it, and outputs λ (where the symbol λ indicates an empty output). Then, it repeatedly
accepts guesses gi = (j, b), where (j, b) is a guess b for cj . If a guess gi is correct, B returns ai = 1.
Otherwise, it outputs ai =  and self-destructs (i.e., all future answers are ). The system B′ behaves
as B except that the initial input x is ignored and the c1, . . . , cn are chosen uniformly at random and
independently.
The behavior of B (and similarly that of B′) is described by a sequence (pB
Ai|Gi)i≥0 of conditional
probability distributions (cf. Section 2.2), where pB
Ai|Gi(a
i, gi) is the probability of observing the out-
puts ai = (λ, a1, . . . , ai) given the inputs g
i = (x, g1, . . . , gi). For simplicity, assume below that g
i is
such that no position is guessed twice (a generalization is straight-forward) and that ai is of the form
{λ}{1}∗{}∗ (as otherwise it has probability 0 anyway).
For system B, all i, and any gi, pB
Ai|Gi(a
i, gi) = 2−(s+1) if ai has s < min(i, t) leading 1’s; this
follows from the t-wise independence of the bits of Enc(x). All remaining output vectors ai, i.e., those
with at least min(i, t) preceding 1’s, share a probability mass of 2−min(i,t), in a way that depends on
the code in use and on x. (It is easily verified that this yields a valid probability distribution.) The
behavior of B′ is obvious given the above (simply replace “t” by “n” in the above description).
Lemma 5. ∆D(B,B′) ≤ 2−t.
Proof. On both systems B and B′, one can define an MBO B that is zero as long as less than t
positions have been guessed correctly. In the following, Bˆ and Bˆ′ denote B and B′ with the MBO,
respectively.
Analogously to the above, the behavior of Bˆ (and similarly that of Bˆ′) is described by a sequence
(pBˆ
Ai,Bi=0|Gi)i≥0 of conditional probability distributions, where p
Bˆ
Ai,Bi=0|Gi(a
i, gi) is the probability
of observing the outputs ai = (λ, a1, . . . , ai) and b0 = b1 = . . . = bi = 0 given the inputs g
i =
(x, g1, . . . , gi). One observes that due to the t-wise independence of Enc(x)’s bits, for i < t,
pBˆAi,Bi=0|Gi(a
i, gi) = pBˆ
′
Ai,Bi=0|Gi(a
i, gi) =

2−(s+1) if ai has s < i leading 1’s,
2−i if ai has i leading 1’s, and
0 otherwise,
and for i ≥ t,
pBˆAi,Bi=0|Gi(a
i, gi) = pBˆ
′
Ai,Bi=0|Gi(a
i, gi) =
{
2−(s+1) if ai has s < t leading 1’s,
0 otherwise.
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System W
init
∀i ∈ [n] : ci ← ∅
on first (encode, x) at o
out x at i
on (tamper, f) with 0 ≤ a(f) ≤ t at o
for i where fi ∈ A(f)
g ← val(fi)
if ci = ∅
out (i, g) at i
get a ∈ {, 1} at i
if a = 
self-destruct
ci ← g
else
if ci 6= g
self-destruct
out x at out
on (tamper, f) with t < a(f) < n− t at o
self-destruct
on (tamper, f) with n− t ≤ a(f) ≤ n at o
for i where fi ∈ A(f)
c′i ← val(fi)
if ∃codeword c∗ : ∀i ∈ A(f) : c′i = c∗i
for i where fi ∈ B(f)
g ← c∗i
if ci = ∅
out (i, g) at i
get a ∈ {, 1} at i
if a = 
self-destruct
ci ← g
else
if ci 6= g
self-destruct
else
self-destruct
out Dec(c∗) at out
Figure 3: The wrapper system W. The command self-destruct causes W to output  at o and to
answer all future queries by . The symbol ∅ stands for “undefined.”
Therefore, Bˆ
g≡ Bˆ′ and ∆D(B,B′) ≤ ΓD(Bˆ′). Observe that by an argument similar to the one
above, adaptivity does not help in provoking the MBO of Bˆ′. Thus, ΓD(Bˆ′) ≤ 2−t, since an optimal
non-adaptive strategy simply tries to guess distinct positions.
Recall that the purpose of the wrapper system W is to emulate H and SsimuF ,τ using B and B
′,
respectively. The key point is to note that low queries f can be answered knowing only the positions
A(f) of Enc(x), high queries knowing only the positions in B(f), and middle queries can always be
rejected. A full description of W can be found in Figure 3. It has an outside interface o and an inside
interface i; at the latter interface, W expects to be connected to either B or B′.
Lemma 6. WB ≡ H.
Proof. Since the distance of the LECSS is d > t, the following holds: A low query results in same
if all injected positions match the corresponding bits of the encoding, and in  otherwise. Similarly,
for a high query, there can be at most one codeword that matches the injected positions. If such a
codeword c∗ exists, the outcome is Dec(c∗) if the bits in the keep-positions match c∗, and otherwise
. By inspection, it can be seen that W acts accordingly.
Consider now the system WB′. Due to the nature of B′, the behavior of WB′ is independent
of the value x that is initially encoded. This allows to easily design a simulator τ as required by
Definition 3. A full description of τ can be found in Figure 4.
Lemma 7. The simulator τ of Figure 4 satisfies WB′ ≡ SsimuF ,τ .
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Simulator τ
init
∀i ∈ [n] : ci←$ {0, 1}
on (1, f) with 0 ≤ a(f) ≤ t
if ∀i ∈ A(f) : val(fi) = ci
return same
else
return 
on (1, f) with t < a(f) < n− t
return 
on (1, f) with n− t ≤ a(f) ≤ n
for i where fi ∈ A(f)
c′i ← val(fi)
for i where fi ∈ B(f)
c′i ← ci
c′ ← c′1 · · · c′n
return Dec(c′)
Figure 4: The simulator τ .
Proof. Consider the systems WB′ and SsimuF ,τ . Both internally choose uniform and independent bits
c1, . . . , cn. System WB
′ answers low queries with the value x initially encoded if all injected positions
match the corresponding random bits and with  otherwise. Simulator τ returns same in the former
case, which SsimuF ,τ replaces by x, and  in the latter case.
Observe that the answer by WB′ to a high query f always matches Dec(c′1 · · · c′n), where for
i ∈ A(f), c′i = val(fi), and for i ∈ B(f), c′i = ci: If no codeword c∗ matching the injected positions
exists, then Dec(c′1 · · · c′n) = , which is also what WB′ outputs. If such c∗ exists and c∗i = ci for all
i ∈ B(f), the output of WB′ is Dec(c′1 · · · c′n). If there exists an i ∈ B(f) with c∗i 6= ci, WB′ outputs
, and in this case Dec(c′1 · · · c′n) =  since the distance of the LECSS is d > t.
The proof of Theorem 3 now follows from a simple triangle inequality.
Proof (of Theorem 3). From Lemmas 4, 5, 6, and 7, one obtains that for all distinguishers D,
∆D(SrealF ,S
simu
F ,τ ) ≤ ∆D(SrealF ,H) + ∆D(H,WB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ ∆D(WB,WB′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆DW(B,B′)
+ ∆D(WB′,SsimuF ,τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ 2−t +
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
+ 2−t ≤ 2−(t−1) +
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
.
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A The Composition Theorem of Constructive Cryptography
The main statement we prove in the main paper shows the security of one protocol step in isolation,
i.e., we show for the non-malleable code that it constructs the multi-bit confidential channel from
multiple assumed single-bit confidential channels. The composition theorem now states that two
such construction steps can be composed: If one (lower-level) protocol constructs the resource that is
assumed by the other (higher-level) protocol, then the composition of those two protocols constructs
the same resource as the higher-level protocol, but from the resources assumed by the lower-level
protocol, under the assumptions that occur in (at least) one of the individual security statements.
The composition theorem was first explicitly stated in [44], but the statement there was restricted
to asymptotic settings. Later, in [36], the theorem was stated in a way that also allows to capture
concrete security statements. The proof, however, still follows the same steps as the one in [44].
To state the theorem, we make use of a special converter id that behaves transparently (i.e., allows
access to the underlying interface of the resource). Furthermore, we assume the operation [·, . . . , ·] to
be left-associative; in this way we can simply express multiple resources using the single variable U.
Theorem 8. Let R,S,T,U ∈ Φ be resources. Let pi = (pi1, pi2) and ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) be protocols, σpi and
σψ be simulators, and (ε
1
pi, ε
2
pi), (ε
1
ψ, ε
2
ψ) such that
R
(pi,σpi ,(ε1pi ,ε
2
pi))
==⇒ S and S
(ψ,σψ ,(ε
1
ψ ,ε
2
ψ))
==⇒ T.
Then
R
(α,σα,(ε1α,ε
2
α))
==⇒ T
with α = (ψ1 ◦ pi1, ψ2 ◦ pi2), σα = σpi ◦ σψ, and εiα(D) = εipi(DσEψ ) + εiψ(DpiA1 piB2 ), where DσEψ and
DpiA1 pi
B
2 mean that D applies the converters at the respective interfaces. Moreover
[R,U]
([pi,(id,id)],[σpi ,id],(ε¯1pi ,ε¯
2
pi))
==⇒ [S,U],
with ε¯ipi(D) = ε
i
pi(D[·,U]), where D[·,U] means that the distinguisher emulates U in parallel. (The
analogous statement holds with respect to [U,R] and [U,S].)
B Channel Resources
From the perspective of constructive cryptography, the purpose of a public-key encryption scheme is to
construct a confidential channel from non-confidential channels. A channel is a resource that involves
a sender A, a receiver B, and—to model channels with different levels of security—an attacker E. The
main types of channels relevant to this work are defined below with respect to interface set {A,B,E}.
All channels are parametrized by a message space M ⊆ {0, 1}∗, which is only made explicit in the
confidential channel (see below), however.
Insecure multiple-use channel. The insecure channel − → transmits multiple messages m ∈M
and corresponds to, for instance, communication via the Internet. If no attacker is present (i.e., in
case ⊥E− →), then all messages are transmitted from A to B faithfully. Otherwise (for − →), the
communication can be controlled via the E-interface, i.e., the attacker learns all messages input at
the A-interface and chooses the messages to be output at the B-interface. The channel is described
in more detail in Figure 5.
Authenticated (unreliable) single-use channel. The (single-use) authenticated channel •−→,
described in Figure 6, allows the sender A to transmit a single message to the receiver B authentically.
That means, while the attacker (at the E-interface) can still read the transmitted message, the only
influence allowed is delaying the message (arbitrarily, i.e., there is no guarantee that the message will
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Channel ⊥E− →
on m at A
output m at B
Channel − →
on m at A
output (msg,m) at E
on (inj,m) at E
output m at B
Figure 5: Insecure, multiple-use communication channel from A to B.
ever be delivered). The channel guarantees that if a message is delivered to B, then this message was
input by A before. There are different constructions that result in the channel •−→, based on, for
instance, MACs or signature schemes.
Channel ⊥E•−→
on first m at A
output m at B
Channel •−→
on first m at A
output (msg,m) at E
on first dlv at E
output m at B (if defined)
Figure 6: Authenticated, single-use communication channel from A to B.
Confidential multiple-use channel. The k-bit confidential channel
k-bit−→• allows to transmit mul-
tiple messages m ∈ {0, 1}k. If no attacker is present (i.e., in case ⊥E k-bit−→•), then all messages are
transmitted from A to B faithfully. Otherwise (for
k-bit−→•), all messages m ∈ {0, 1}k input at the
A-interface are stored in a buffer B.10 The attacker can then choose messages from the buffer B (by
using an index) to be delivered at the B-interface, or inject messages from {0, 1}k which are then also
output at the B-interface. Note that E cannot inject messages that depend on those in B, i.e., the
confidential channel is non-malleable. It is described in more detail in Figure 7.
Channel ⊥E k-bit−→•
on m ∈ {0, 1}k at A
output m at B
Channel
k-bit−→•
init
i← 0
B ← ∅
on m ∈ {0, 1}k at A
i← i+ 1
B ← B ∪ {(i,m)}
output (msg, i) at E
on (dlv, i′) at E
if ∃m : (i′,m) ∈ B
output m at B
on (inj,m′) at E
output m′ at B
Figure 7: Confidential, multiple-use k-bit channel from A to B.
C Non-Malleable Codes and the One-Time Pad
C.1 The Malleability of the One-Time Pad
The one-time pad encryption scheme is strongly malleable: If a transmitted ciphertext e ∈ {0, 1}n
(corresponding to some message m ∈ {0, 1}n) is replaced by a different ciphertext e′ ∈ {0, 1}n, then
the decryption of e′ will result in m ⊕ (e ⊕ e′). From the attacker’s perspective, the one-time pad is
XOR-malleable: By replacing the ciphertext e by e⊕ δ for some δ ∈ {0, 1}n, he can maul the plaintext
from m into m⊕ δ.
This circumstance is captured by the XOR-malleable channel (an {A,B,E}-resource), described
in Figure 8. It allows the sender A to input a single message m. If no attacker is present (i.e., in case
⊥E n-bit−−⊕→•), m is simply output at B. Otherwise (for n-bit−−⊕→•), the attacker at interface E can specify
a mask δ to be added to the plaintext m.
10The  in the symbol k-bit−→• is to suggest the presence of B.
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Channel ⊥E n-bit−−⊕→•
on first m ∈ {0, 1}n at A
output m at B
Channel
n-bit−−⊕→•
on first m ∈ {0, 1}n at A
output (msg, 1) at E
on first (xor, δ) at E
output m⊕ δ at B (if defined)
Figure 8: The XOR-malleable channel from A to B.
Let
n-bit•===• be the resource that outputs a uniformly random n-bit key at A and B and offers
no functionality at E. Additionally, let −→ and −→• the single-use versions of − → and −→•,
respectively (cf. Section B). Moreover, consider the (straight-forward) protocol otp = (otp-enc, otp-dec)
that implements one-time pad encryption. Then,
[
n-bit•===•,−→] otp==⇒ n-bit−−⊕→• . (7)
The proof of (7) is a restricted case of [44, Lemma 2].
C.2 Getting Rid of the Malleability
One can overcome the malleability described above using a non-malleable code secure against the
class Fbit of tampering functions that modify every bit independently.11 Thus, assume there exists
a (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) that is (Fbit, 1, 1, ε)-non-malleable for some ε > 0 (according to
Definition 3),12 and consider the following protocol nmc = (encode, decode): Converter encode, ob-
taining a message m ∈ {0, 1}k at its outside interface, computes c←$ Enc(m) and outputs c at its
inside interface; converter decode, obtaining a message c′ ∈ {0, 1}n at its inside interface, computes
m′ ← Dec(c′) and outputs m′ at its outside interface.
Theorem 9. Assume that (Enc,Dec) is a (k, n)-coding scheme and (Fbit, ε)-non-malleable. Then,
there exists a simulator σ such that
n-bit−−⊕→• (nmc,σ,(0,ε))==⇒ k-bit−→• .
Proof. The availability condition holds by the correctness of the code.
Let F := Fbit, SrealF := SrealF ,1,1 and SsimuF ,τ := SsimuF ,τ,1,1, where τ is the simulator guaranteed to exist
by Definition 3. Note that a function f ∈ F can be characterized by a vector χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn)
where fi ∈ {zero, one, keep, flip}, with the meaning that f takes as input a codeword c and outputs a
codeword c′ = c′1 · · · c′n in which each bit is either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), left unchanged (keep),
or flipped (flip).
Consider the following simulator σ (based on τ), which simulates the E-interface of
n-bit−−⊕→• at its
outside interface: When it receives (msg, 1) at the inside interface, it outputs (msg, 1) at the outside
interface. When it gets (xor, δ) with δ = δ1 · · · δn at the outside interface, it computes x′←$ τ(1, f),
where f is the function such that χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) for
fj :=
{
keep if δj = 0, and
flip if δj = 1.
If x = (same, 1), σ outputs (dlv, 1) at the inside interface, and otherwise, it outputs (inj, x).
Consider the following reduction C, which provides interfaces A, B, and E on the outside and
expects to connect to either SrealF or S
simu
F ,τ on the inside: When a message m is input at the A-
interface, C outputs (msg, 1) at the E interface. When (xor, δ) is input at interface E, it computes f
11The proof below makes apparent that one would in fact only need a non-malleable code secure against tampering
functions that either keep or flip each bit of the encoding independently.
12This is a slight abuse of notation, since Fbit is just a single family of tamper functions and not a sequence thereof.
This is acceptable since only non-adaptive, single-shot non-malleability is considered in this section.
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the same way τ does and outputs (tamper, f) at the inside interface. The subsequent response x′ is
output at interface B.
Consider the systems CSrealF and encode
AdecodeB
n-bit−−⊕→•. The output at the E-interface upon
input m ∈ {0, 1}k at the A-interface is the same in in both systems, namely (msg, 1). Moreover,
with CSrealF the output at the B-interface on input (xor, δ) at the E-interface is computed by ap-
plying the tampering function f corresponding to δ to the encoding of the value m; exactly as
in encodeAdecodeB
n-bit−−⊕→•.
Consider the systems CSsimuF ,τ and σ
E k-bit−→•. Again, when m ∈ {0, 1}k is input at A, (msg, 1) is
output at E in either system. In CSsimuF ,τ , the output at the B-interface on input (xor, δ) at the E-
interface is computed by invoking the simulator τ on the tampering function f corresponding to δ;
exactly as in σE
k-bit−→•.
Therefore,
CSrealF ≡ encodeAdecodeB
n-bit−−⊕→• and CSsimuF ,τ ≡ σE
k-bit−→•,
which implies
∆D(encodeAdecodeB
n-bit−−⊕→•, σE k-bit−→•) = ∆D(CSrealF ,CSsimuF ,τ ) = ∆DC(SrealF ,SsimuF ,τ ) ≤ ε
for all distinguishers D.
D SD-CCA Security and Deferred Material from Section 3
In Section 3, we provide a protocol (a pair of converters) m-pke = (m-encrypt,m-decrypt) that achieves
transformation
[←−•,− →] m-pke==⇒ k-bit−→• (5)
and results from composing protocol 1-pke = (1-encrypt, 1-decrypt), achieving
[←−•,− →] 1-pke==⇒ [ 1-bit−→•]n, (3)
with protocol nmc = (encode, decode), achieving
[
1-bit−→•]n nmc==⇒ k-bit−→• . (4)
In this section we fill in the deferred details: First, we formally define the notion of self-destruct
CCA security (SD-CCA) (Section D.1). Second, we show in detail how protocol 1-pke is obtained from
a 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE and prove its security (Section D.2). Third, we formally prove Theorem 1,
which states that nmc achieves construction (4) (Section D.3). Fourth, we show that protocol m-pke
corresponds (in a straight-forward manner) to a PKE scheme Π and prove that Π is SD-CCA secure
(Section D.4). Finally, for comparison to our constructive approach we also provide a direct game-
based proof of the fact that combining single-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE with a non-malleable code as
shown above yields a multi-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE scheme (Section D.5).
D.1 Formal Definition of SD-CCA
In this section we define SD-CCA security and a replayable variant thereof called SD-RCCA security.
The notion of replayable CCA security (RCCA) in general was introduced by Canetti et al. [6] to
deal with the artificial strictness of full CCA security. Roughly, RCCA security weakens full CCA
security by potentially allowing an attacker to maul a ciphertext into one that decrypts to the identical
message.
The only difference between the SD-CCA game and the standard game used to define CCA is that
the decryption oracle self-destructs, i.e., it stops processing further queries once an invalid ciphertext
is queried. Note that the self-destruct feature only affects the decryption oracle; the adversary is
still allowed to get the challenge ciphertext after provoking a self-destruct. The game is phrased as a
distinguishing problem between the two systems Gsd-cca0 and G
sd-cca
1 described in Figure 9.
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System Gsd-ccab
init
(pk, sk)← K
output pk
on (chall,m0,m1) with |m1| = |m0|
e← Epk(mb)
output e
on (dec, e′)
m′ ← Dsk(e′)
if m′ = 
self-destruct
else if e′ = e
output test
else
output m′
Figure 9: System Gsd-ccab , where b ∈ {0, 1}, defining SD-CCA security of a PKE scheme Π =
(K,E,D). The command self-destruct causes the system to output  and to answer all future de-
cryption queries by .
Definition 5. A PKE scheme Π = (K,E,D) is (t, q, ε)-SD-CCA secure if
∆D(Gsd-cca0 ,G
sd-cca
1 ) ≤ ε
for all distinguishers D with running time at most t and making at most q decryption queries.
For b ∈ {0, 1}, let Gsd-rccab be the game that behaves as Gsd-ccab , except that it outputs test whenever
Dsk(e
′) ∈ {m0,m1} for a decryption query e′.
Definition 6. A PKE scheme Π = (K,E,D) is (t, q, ε)-SD-RCCA secure if
∆D(Gsd-rcca0 ,G
sd-rcca
1 ) ≤ ε
for all distinguishers D with running time at most t and making at most q decryption queries.
D.2 Single-bit Channels from Single-bit PKE
Following the proof of [12, Theorem 2], we first show that a 1-bit SD-CCA-secure PKE scheme can
be used to design a protocol 1-pke′ that achieves the construction
[←−•,− →] 1-pke
′
==⇒ 1-bit−→•, (2)
Using the composition theorem, one then obtains
[←−•,− →]n 1-pke
′′
==⇒ [ 1-bit−→•]n,
where 1-pke′′ = (1-encrypt′′, 1-decrypt′′) and where 1-encrypt′′ and 1-decrypt′′ are the n-fold parallel
composition of 1-encrypt′ and 1-decrypt′, respectively. A slight modification of protocol 1-pke′′ yields
the protocol 1-pke for construction (3). Essentially, all public keys are concatenated and sent via a
single ←−•. A proof of security is straight-forward.
Towards a proof of (2), let Π = (K,E,D) be a PKE scheme and consider the following pair of
protocol converters 1-pke′ = (1-encrypt′, 1-decrypt′): Converter 1-encrypt′ works as follows: It initially
expects a public key pk at the inside interface. When a message m is input at the outside interface,
1-encrypt′ outputs e←$ Epk(m) at the inside interface. Converter 1-decrypt′ initially generates a key
pair (pk, sk) using key-generation algorithm K and outputs pk at the inside interface. When 1-decrypt′
receives e′ at the inside interface, it computes m′ ← Dsk(e′), outputs m′ at the outside interface, and
if m′ = , implements the self-destruct mode, i.e., outputs  on the outside for all future ciphertexts
received on the inside.
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Theorem 10. There exists a simulator σ and for any ` ∈ N there exists a (efficient) reduction C
such that for every D,
∆D(1-encrypt′A1-decrypt′B[←−•, `− →], σE 1-bit,`−→•) ≤ ` ·∆DC(Gsd-cca0 ,Gsd-cca1 ),
where the additional superscript ` indicates that the channel processes only the first ` messages at
interface A.
Proof. First, consider the following simulator σ for interface E of
1-bit,`−→•: Initially, it generates a key
pair (pk, sk) and outputs pk at the outside interface. When it receives (msg, i) at the inside interface,
it generates an encryption e←$ Epk(m¯) of some 1-bit message m¯, outputs (msg, e) at the outside
interface, and records (e, i). When (inj, e′) is input at the outside interface, σ proceeds as follows: If
(e′, i′) has been recorded for some i′, it outputs (dlv, i′) at its inside interface. Otherwise, it computes
m′ ← Dsk(e′), outputs (inj,m′) at the inside interface, and if m′ = , it implements the self-destruct
mode: for any future (inj, e′) input at the outside interface it outputs (inj, ) at the inside interface.
Consider now the problem of distinguishing the two systems
U := 1-encryptA1-decryptB[←−•, 1− →] and V := σE 1-bit,1−→• .
A distinguisher D connected to U initially sees a public key at interface E. If D inputs a message m
at interface A, an encryption of m (created by 1-encrypt) is output at interface E. When D inputs a
ciphertext e′ at E, it sees a decryption of e′ (by 1-decrypt) at B. The system V behaves differently:
Initially, D also sees a public key. But when it inputs a message m at A, an encryption e of m¯ is
output at interface E (by simulator σ). When e is input at interface E, m is output at B (as σ issues
a deliver instruction to the channel). When e′ 6= e is input at E, a decryption of e′ (injected by σ) is
output at B.
The translation between the channel setting and the game setting is achieved by the following
reduction system C′: Initially, C′ takes a value (which will be the public key pk) from the game and
outputs it at the E-interface. When a message m is input at interface A of C′, (chall,m, m¯) is output
to the game. The resulting challenge e is output as (msg, e) at interface E. When (inj, e) is input
at interface E, C′ outputs m at interface B. When (inj, e′) with e′ 6= e is input at interface E, C′
passes (dec, e′) to the game and outputs the answer m′ at interface B. If m′ = , C′ implements the
self-destruct mode: All future (inj, e′) at interface E are handled by outputting  at B. We have
C′Gsd-cca0 ≡ U and C′Gsd-cca1 ≡ V,
and thus
∆D(1-encryptA1-decryptB[←−•, `− →], σE 1-bit,`−→•) ≤ ` ·∆DC′′(U,V)
= ` ·∆DC′′(C′Gsd-cca0 ,C′Gsd-cca1 )
= ` ·∆DC(Gsd-cca0 ,Gsd-cca1 ),
where C := C′′C′ and the first inequality follows from a standard hybrid argument for a reduction
system C′′.
D.3 Tying the Channels Together
Theorem 1. For any `, q ∈ N, if (Enc,Dec) is (Fcopy, ε, `, q)-continuously non-malleable, there exists
a simulator σ such that
[
1-bit,`,q−→• ]n (nmc,σ,(0,ε))==⇒ k-bit,`,q−→• ,
where the additional superscripts `, q on a channel mean that it only processes the first ` queries at
the A-interface and only the first q queries at the E-interface.
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Proof. The availability condition holds by the correctness of the code.
Let F := Fcopy, SrealF := SrealF ,`,q, and SsimuF ,τ := SsimuF ,τ,`,q where τ is the simulator guaranteed to exist
by Definition 3.
Consider the following simulator σ (based on τ), which simulates the E-sub-interfaces of the 1-
bit confidential channels at its outside interface: When (msg, i) is received at the inside interface, it
outputs (msg, i) at each outside sub-interface corresponding to a 1-bit confidential channel. Whenever
σ receives one instruction to either deliver13 ((dlv, i′) for i′ ∈ N) or inject ((inj,m′) for m′ ∈ {0, 1}) a
bit at each outside sub-interface corresponding to one of the confidential channels, it assembles these
to a function f with χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) as follows: For all j = 1, . . . , n,
fj :=

zero if the instruction on the jth sub-interface is (inj, 0),
one if the instruction on the jth sub-interface is (inj, 1),
copyi′ if the instruction on the j
th sub-interface is (dlv, i′).
Then, σ invokes τ to obtain x′←$ τ(i, f), where i is the number of instructions (msg, i) received at
the inside interface so far. If x′ = (same, j), σ outputs (dlv, j) at the inside interface. Otherwise, it
outputs (inj, x′). If x′ = , σ outputs (inj, ) at the inside interface and implements the self-destruct
mode, i.e., outputs (inj, ) at the inside interface for all future inputs to the simulated interfaces of the
single-bit channels.
Consider the following reduction C, which provides interfaces A, B, and E on the outside and
expects to connect to either SrealF or S
simu
F ,τ on the inside. When a message m is input at the A-
interface, C outputs (encode,m) on the inside. Similarly to σ, it repeatedly collects instructions input
at the E-sub-interfaces and uses them to form a tamper function f , which it outputs on the inside as
(tamper, f). Then, it outputs the answer x′ received on the inside at the B-interface. Additionally, if
x′ = , C implements the self-destruct mode, i.e., subsequently only outputs  at interface B.
One observes that
CSrealF ≡ encodeAdecodeB[
1-bit−→•]n and CSsimuF ,τ ≡ σE
k-bit,`,q−→• .
Thus, for all distinguishers D,
∆D(encodeAdecodeB[
1-bit−→•]n, σE k-bit,`,q−→•) = ∆D(CSrealF ,CSsimuF ,τ ) = ∆DC(SrealF ,SsimuF ,τ ) ≤ ε.
D.4 From Protocols to PKE Schemes
The PKE scheme Π = (K,E,D) corresponding to our protocol m-pke can be obtained as follows. The
key generation algorithm K generates n independent key pairs of the 1-bit scheme. The encryption
algorithm E first encodes a message using a non-malleable code and then encrypts each bit of the
resulting encoding independently and outputs the n resulting ciphertexts. The decryption algorithm
D first decrypts the n ciphertexts, decodes the resulting bitstring, and outputs the decoded message
or the symbol , indicating an invalid ciphertext, if any of these steps fails. The scheme is described
in more detail in Figure 10.
PKE scheme Π achieves only replayable SD-CCA security (SD-RCCA). The reason for this is
that given any ciphertext e, an attacker can replace the first component of e by a fresh encryption
of a randomly chosen bit and thereby obtain, with probability 1/2, a ciphertext e′ that decrypts to
the same message as e. In [6], the authors provide generic ways to achieve full CCA security from
replayable CCA security. As shown in subsequent work [13] to this paper, these techniques can also
be applied in the context of self-destruct CCA security.
13For simplicity, assume that no deliver instruction (dlv, i′) for some i′ greater than the largest number i received via
(msg, i) at the inside interface so far is input.
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PKE Scheme Π′ = (K ′, E′, D′)
Key Generation K ′
for i← 1 to n
(pki, ski)←$K
pk← (pk1, . . . , pkn)
sk← (sk1, . . . , skn)
return (pk, sk)
Encryption E′pk(m)
c = c1 · · · cn ← Enc(m)
for i← 1 to n
ei←$ Epki(ci)
return e = (e1, . . . , en)
Decryption D′sk(e)
for i← 1 to n
ci←$Dski(ei)
if ci = 
return 
m← Dec(c1 · · · cn)
return m
Figure 10: The k-bit PKE scheme Π′ = (K ′, E′, D′) built from a 1-bit PKE scheme Π = (K,E,D)
and a (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec).
It remains to prove that our PKE scheme is indeed SD-RCCA secure, based on the security of
protocol m-pke; the proof follows that of [12, Theorem 4]. In the following, let
U := m-encryptAm-decryptB[←−•,− →] and V := σE k-bit−→•,
where σ is an arbitrary simulator.
Theorem 11. There exist efficient reductions C0 and C1 such that, for all adversaries D,
∆D(Gsd-rcca0 ,G
sd-rcca
1 ) ≤ ∆DC0(U,V) + ∆DC1(U,V).
Proof. Consider the following reductions C0 and C1. Both connect to an {A,B,E}-resource on the
inside and provide a single interface on the outside: Initially, both obtain (msg, pk) at the inside E-
interface and output pk at the outside interface. When (chall,m0,m1) is received on the outside, C0
outputs m0 at the inside A-interface and C1 outputs m1. Subsequently, (msg, e) is received at the
inside E-interface, and e is output on the outside by both systems. When a decryption query (dec, e′)
is received on the outside, both systems output (inj, e′) at the inside E-interface. A subsequently
received message m′ at B is output on the outside by both systems (as answer to the decryption
query) unless m′ ∈ {m0,m1}, in which case test is returned. Moreover, if m′ = , both reduction
systems self-destruct, i.e., they answer all future decryption queries by . We have
C0U ≡ Gsd-rcca0 and C1U ≡ Gsd-rcca1 and C0V ≡ C1V,
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that, in V, the input from
k-bit−→• to σ is the same in
both systems (the output (msg, 1)) and that decryption queries causing m0 or m1 to be output at the
B-interface are answered by test. Hence,
∆D(Gsd-rcca0 ,G
sd-rcca
1 ) = ∆
D(C0U,C1U) ≤ ∆D(C0U,C0V) + ∆D(C0V,C1V) + ∆D(C1V,C1U)
= ∆DC0(U,V) + ∆DC1(U,V).
D.5 Game-Based Proof
This section contains a direct proof that our k-bit PKE scheme Π′ is SD-RCCA secure if Π is a
SD-CCA-secure 1-bit PKE scheme and (Enc,Dec) a continuously non-malleable coding scheme. The
proof is a hybrid argument and is obtained by “unwrapping” the concatenation of the theorems from
Sections 3 and D.4. The modular nature and the intuitive simplicity of the proofs in Section 3 are
lost, however. Concretely, we prove:
Theorem 12. If Π is a (t+ t˜, q, ε)-SD-CCA secure 1-bit PKE scheme and (Enc,Dec) is a (Fcopy, εnmc,
1, q)-non-malleable coding scheme,14 then Π′ is a (t, q, 2nε+ 2εnmc)-SD-RCCA PKE scheme, where t˜
represents a (very) small overhead.
14The reason one does not need adaptive continuous non-malleability is because PKE games are normally formulated
as single-challenge games.
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In the following, let F := Fcopy. Moreover, let Gsd-rcca0 and Gsd-rcca1 be the systems capturing the
SD-RCCA security for Π′, and similarly Gsd-cca0 and Gsd-cca1 the ones for the SD-CCA security of Π.
The proof of Theorem 12 follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 13. For b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ [n], there exist reduction systems C(i)b and Cbb such that for all
distinguishers D.
∆D(Gsd-rcca0 ,G
sd-rcca
1 ) ≤
∑
b,i
∆DC
(i)
b (Gsd-cca0 ,G
sd-cca
1 ) +
∑
b
∆DCbb(SrealF ,S
simu
F ,τ ),
where τ is the simulator for the non-malleable code. Moreover, all reductions preserve the number of
queries q.
Proof (of Theorem 12). Let t˜ be the maximal occurring overhead caused by the reduction systems
C
(i)
b . Fix a distinguisher D having running time t and making at most q decryption queries. For all
b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ [n], system DC(i)b makes no more decryption queries than D and has running time
at most t+ t˜, and DCb makes at most as many tamper queries as D makes decryption queries. Hence,
∆DC
(i)
b (Gsd-cca0 ,G
sd-cca
1 ) ≤ ε and ∆DCb(SlorF ,0,SlorF ,1) ≤ εnmc, which completes the proof.
Towards a proof of Lemma 13, consider the following hybrid systems for b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ [n]: H(i)b
proceeds as Gsd-rccab except that the challenge query (chall,m0,m1) and decryption queries (dec, e
′) are
handled differently:
• Challenge query: The first i bits of the encoding c = c1 · · · cn of mb are replaced by uniformly
random and independent bits. The resulting n-bit string is then encrypted bit-wise (as done by
E). This results in the challenge ciphertext e = (e1, . . . , en).
• Decryption query: Let e′ = (e′1, . . . , e′n). System H
(i)
b computes c
′ = c′1 · · · c′n, where
c′j =
{
cj if e
′
j = ej , and
Dskj (e
′
j) otherwise.
Then, H
(i)
b outputs Dec(c
′) as the answer to the decryption query.15
Let H
(0)
b := G
sd-rcca
b .
Lemma 14. For all b ∈ {0, 1} and i = 1, . . . , n, there exists C(i)b such that for all D
∆D(H
(i−1)
b ,H
(i)
b ) = ∆
DC
(i)
b (Gsd-cca0 ,G
sd-cca
1 ).
Proof. Fix b and i. System C
(i)
b works as follows: Initially, it generates n − 1 key pairs (pkj , skj) for
j ∈ [n] \ {i}, obtains pki (but not ski) on the inside interface (from Gsd-cca0 or Gsd-cca1 ), and outputs
pk := (pk1, . . . , pkn) on the outside. When it receives (chall,m0,m1) on the outside, it computes an
encoding c = c1 · · · cn ← Enc(mb). Then, it chooses i random bits c˜1, . . . , c˜i and computes
ej =
{
Epkj (c˜j) for j < i, and
Epkj (cj) for j > i.
Moreover, it outputs (chall, ci, c˜i) at the inside and obtains a ciphertext ei. It finally outputs e =
(e1, . . . , en) at the outside interface.
When C
(i)
b receives a decryption query (dec, e
′) for e′ = (e′1, . . . , e′n) at its outside interface, it
proceeds as follows: For j 6= i, it computes c′j as H(i)b does. Moreover, if e′i = ei, it sets c′i ← ci.
15Assume here and below that Dec(c′) =  if any of the bits c′j equal .
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Otherwise, it outputs (dec, e′i) at the inside interface and obtains the answer c
′
i. Then, it computes
m′ ← Dec(c′). If m′ = , C(i)b implements the self-destruct mode. Otherwise, it outputs m′ at the
outside interface unless m′ ∈ {m0,m1}, in which case the output is test.
Consider the systems C
(i)
b G
sd-cca
0 and H
(i−1)
b . Both systems generate the public key in the same
fashion. As to the challenge ciphertext, the first i−1 ciphertext components ej generated by C(i)b Gsd-cca0
are encryptions of random bits c˜j , whereas the i
th and the remaining components are encryptions of
the corresponding bits of an encoding of mb (generated by G
sd-cca
0 and C
(i)
b , respectively). The same is
true for H
(i−1)
b . The result of a decryption query (dec, e
′) sent to C(i)b G
sd-cca
0 is Dec(c
′) for c′ = c′1 · · · c′n,
where c′j = Dskj (e
′
j) unless j < i and e
′
j = ej , in which case c
′
j = c˜j . Again, the same holds for system
H
(i−1)
b . Moreover, both systems answer test if Dec(c
′) ∈ {m0,m1}.
Systems C
(i)
b G
sd-cca
1 and H
(i)
b are compared similarly. Therefore,
C
(i)
b G
sd-cca
0 ≡ H(i−1)b and C(i)b Gsd-cca1 ≡ H(i)b ,
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 15. There exists Cb such that
1. CbS
real
F ≡ H(n)b for b ∈ {0, 1}, and
2. C0S
simu
F ,τ ≡ C1SsimuF ,τ .
Proof. System Cb works as follows: Initially, it generates n key pairs (pki, ski) and outputs pk =
(pk1, . . . , pkn) at the outside interface. When it receives (chall,m0,m1) at the outside interface,
it chooses n random values c˜1, . . . , c˜n, computes ei←$ Epk(c˜i) for i = 1, . . . , n, and outputs e =
(e1, . . . , en) at the outside interface. Additionally, it outputs (encode,mb) at the inside interface.
When it gets a decryption query (dec, e′) with e′ = (e′1, . . . , e′n), it proceeds as follows: First, it
creates a tamper query f with χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) where
fi =

zero if e′i 6= ei and Dski(e′i) = 0,
one if e′i 6= ei and Dski(e′i) = 1, and
keep if e′i = ei.
Then, it outputs (tamper, f) at the inside interface and obtains an answer x′. If x′ = , Cb implements
the self-destruct mode. If x′ ∈ {m0,m1}, Cb outputs test at the outside interface. Otherwise, it
outputs x′.
For b ∈ {0, 1}, consider the systems CbSrealF and H(n)b . Both systems generate the public key in
the same fashion. Furthermore, in either system, the challenge ciphertext consists of n encryptions of
random bits. Finally, both systems answer a decryption query by applying the same tamper function
to an encoding of mb before decoding it. When the decoding of the tampered codeword results in m0
or m1, both systems answer test. Thus, CbS
real
F ≡ H(n)b .
Due to the fact that test is output when a decryption query results in m0 or m1, the observable
behavior is the same in C0S
simu
F ,τ and C1S
simu
F ,τ .
16 Therefore, C0S
simu
F ,τ ≡ C1SsimuF ,τ .
Proof (of Lemma 13). Follows immediately from Lemmas 14 and 15 using a triangle inequality.
E Achieving Adaptive Continuous Non-Malleability
Theorem 2. If a (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) is continuously (Fcopy, ε, 1, q)-non-malleable, it is
also continuously (Fcopy, 2`ε+ q`2k , `, q)-non-malleable, for all `, q ∈ N.
16This is where the proof reflects that Π is only SD-RCCA secure.
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System SlorF ,b
init
i← 0
on (encode, x0, x1)
i← i+ 1
x
(i)
0 ←$ x0
x
(i)
1 ←$ x1
c(i)←$ Enc(xb)
on (tamper, f) with f ∈ F (i)
c′ ← f(c(1), . . . , c(i))
x′←$ Dec(c′)
if x′ = 
self-destruct
if ∃j : x′ ∈ {x(j)0 , x(j)1 }
x′ ← (same, j)
out x′
Figure 11: Systems SlorF,0 and S
lor
F,1 defining LOR-
non-malleability of (Enc,Dec). The self-destruct com-
mand has the effect that  is output and all future queries
are answered by .
Left-or-right non-malleability. The proof of
Theorem 2, which uses a hybrid argument, is
facilitated by introducing a left-or-right (LOR)
variant of non-malleability. The two definitions
are equivalent, as shown by Lemmas 16 and 17
below. In the LOR variant,17 the encode-oracle
takes as input pairs of messages and encodes ei-
ther always the first or always the second mes-
sage. The goal of the attacker is to find out which
is the case. Formally, LOR-non-malleability is
defined using the two random systems SlorF ,0 and
SlorF ,1, shown in Figure 11.
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When processing a tamper query, if there are multiple indices j for which (same, j) could be
output, SlorF ,b outputs the largest such j. As before, for b ∈ {0, 1} and `, q ∈ N, SlorF ,b,`,q is the system
that behaves as SlorF ,b except that only the first ` encode-queries and the first q tamper-queries are
handled.
Definition 7 (Adaptive continuous left-or-right non-malleability). Let F = (F (i))i≥1 be a sequence
of function families F (i) ⊆ {f | f : ({0, 1}n)i → {0, 1}n} and let `, q ∈ N. A coding scheme (Enc,Dec)
is adaptively continuously (F , ε, `, q)-LOR-non-malleable (or simply (F , ε, `, q)-LOR-non-malleable)
if there exists a simulator τ such that ∆D(SlorF ,0,`,q,S
lor
F ,1,`,q) ≤ ε for all distinguishers D.
Lemma 16. If (Enc,Dec) is (F , ε, `, q)-non-malleable, it is also (F , 2ε, `, q)-LOR-non-malleable.
Proof. Fix `, q, and a simulator τ , and let SrealF := S
real
F ,`,q, S
simu
F ,τ := S
simu
F ,τ,`,q, S
lor
F ,0 := S
lor
F ,0,`,q, and
SlorF ,1 := S
lor
F ,1,`,q. For b ∈ {0, 1}, consider the following reduction Cb: Upon the ith query (encode, x0, x1)
at the outside interface, it stores x
(i)
0 := x0 and x
(i)
1 := x1 internally and outputs (encode, xb) at the
inside interface. Upon a query (tamper, f) at the outside interface, Cb outputs (tamper, f) at the
inside interface and subsequently receives a value x′ at the inside interface. If there exist indices i′
such that x′ ∈ {x(i′)0 , x(i
′)
1 }, Cb outputs (same, i′) for the largest such index at the outside interface.
Otherwise, it outputs x′.
One observers that
C0S
real
F ≡ SlorF ,0 and C1SrealF ≡ SlorF ,1 and C0SsimuF ,τ ≡ C1SsimuF ,τ ,
where the third equivalence follows from the fact that the observable behavior of CbS
simu
F ,τ is independent
of the messages Cb outputs to S
simu
F ,τ . Hence, for all attackers A,
∆A(SlorF ,0,S
lor
F ,1) = ∆
A(C0S
real
F ,C1S
real
F )
≤ ∆A(C0SrealF ,C0SsimuF ,τ ) + ∆A(C0SsimuF ,τ ,C1SsimuF ,τ ) + ∆A(C1SsimuF ,τ ,C1SrealF )
≤ ∆AC0(SrealF ,SsimuF ,τ ) + ∆AC1(SrealF ,SsimuF ,τ )
≤ 2ε.
Lemma 17. If (Enc,Dec) is (F , ε, `, q)-LOR-non-malleable, it is also (F , ε+ q`
2k
, `, q)-non-malleable.
17One should not confuse the above LOR variant with strong non-malleability, the difference being that for strong
non-malleability SlorF,b would output (same, j) iff c
′ = c(j). In fact, being equivalent to non-malleability, our LOR variant
is strictly weaker.
18The same LOR variant was already considered in [23, Definition A.1] (and referred to as “alternative” non-
malleability). In this sense Lemma 16 and 17 below are a generalization of [23, Theorem A.1] to the adaptive and
continuous case.
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Proof. Fix ` and q, and let SrealF := S
real
F ,`,q, S
simu
F ,τ := S
simu
F ,τ,`,q (for a simulator τ to be defined next),
SlorF ,0 := S
lor
F ,0,`,q, and S
lor
F ,1 := S
lor
F ,1,`,q. Consider the following simulator τ : It internally keeps a counter
i ← 0. When invoked on (i′, f) with f ∈ F (i′), if i′ > i, it samples x(j)1 ←$ {0, 1}k \ {x(1)1 , . . . , x(j−1)1 }
and computes c
(j)
1 ←$ Enc(x(j)1 ) for all i < j ≤ i′ and sets i ← i′. Then, it computes the tampered
codeword c′ ← Dec(f(c(1)1 , . . . , c(i)1 )) and decodes it to x′ ← Dec(c′). If x′ = x(j)1 for some indices j, τ
returns (same, j) for the largest such j. Otherwise, it returns x′.
Consider the following reduction C: Upon the ith query (encode, x) at the outside interface, it
chooses x
(i)
1 ←$ {0, 1}k \ {x(1)1 , . . . , x(i−1)1 }, stores x(i)0 := x internally, and outputs (encode, x(i)0 , x(i)1 ) at
the inside interface. Upon a query (tamper, f) at the outside interface, C outputs (tamper, f) at the
inside interface and subsequently receives a value x′ at the inside interface. If x′ = (same, j) for some
j, C outputs x
(j)
0 at the outside interface. Otherwise, it outputs x
′.
Observe that CSlorF ,1 ≡ SsimuF ,τ . In both cases, the ith query of the type (encode, x) is treated by
sampling fresh values x
(i)
1 distinct from all x
(1)
1 , . . . , x
(i−1)
1 and computing c
(i)
1 as an encoding of x
(i)
1 .
(This is delayed in SsimuF ,τ , but that does not change the distribution.) A query (tamper, f) with some
function f ∈ F (i) is answered by evaluating f(c(1)1 , . . . , c(i)1 ), decoding the resulting codeword to obtain
a message x′, and if x′ = x(j)1 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, returning x(j)0 and x′ otherwise.
The systems CSlorF ,0 and S
real
F are, however, not equivalent. The reason is that if, in CS
lor
F ,0,
Dec(f(c
(1)
0 , . . . , c
(i)
0 )) = x
(j)
1 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, then SlorF ,0 returns (same, j), which C replaces
by x
(j)
0 . There is no comparable behavior in S
real
F . Provoking this event, however, corresponds to
“non-adaptively guessing” one of the values x
(j)
1 , which occurs with probability at most
i
2k
in each
query.
Formally, one can define a monotone binary output (MBO, see Section 2.1) on CSlorF ,0; ĈS
lor
F ,0 (the
system extended by this additional output) and SrealF are now conditionally equivalent, and by [45,
Theorem 1], the distinguishing advantage ∆A(CSlorF ,0,S
real
F ) is upper-bounded by the probability of
provoking this event, which for at most ` encode- and at most q tamper-queries can be bounded by q`
2k
.
Hence, for all attackers A,
∆A(SrealF ,S
simu
F ,τ ) = ∆
A(SrealF ,CS
lor
F ,1)
≤ ∆A(SrealF ,CSlorF ,0) + ∆A(CSlorF ,0,CSlorF ,1)
≤ q`
2k
+ ∆AC(SlorF ,0,S
lor
F ,1)
≤ q`
2k
+ ε.
Lemma 18. If (Enc,Dec) is continuously (Fcopy, ε, 1, q)-LOR-non-malleable, it is also continuously
(Fcopy, ` · ε, `, q)-LOR-non-malleable, for all ` ∈ N.
Proof. Fix ` and q, let F := Fcopy, and set S′b := SlorF ,b,`,q and Sb := SlorF ,b,1,q for b ∈ {0, 1}.
The distinguishing advantage between S′0 and S′1 is bounded via a hybrid argument, where the
ith hybrid H(i) picks x0 when processing the first i encode queries (encode, x0, x1) and x1 afterwards.
For each i, the distinguishing advantage between successive hybrids H(i−1) and H(i) is bounded by
exhibiting a system Ci that reduces distinguishing S0 and S1 to distinguishing the hybrids.
For i = 0, 1, . . . , `, hybrid H(i) works as follows: Initialization and (tamper, f) are defined as with
S′0 and S′1. The first i queries (encode, x0, x1) are handled by encoding x0, i.e., c(j) ← Enc(x0) for the
jth encoding. For all later queries, x1 is encoded, i.e., c
(j) ← Enc(x1).
One observes that
H(`) ≡ S′0 and H(0) ≡ S′1.
For i = 1, . . . , n, reduction Ci works as follows: For the first i − 1 encode queries (encode, x0, x1)
(at the outside interface), it computes and stores an encoding of x0, i.e., c
(j) ← Enc(x0) for the
29
jth encoding. Upon the ith query (encode, x0, x1), it outputs (encode, x0, x1) at the inside interface.
(Note that as a consequence, a target encoding c←$ Enc(xb) is generated, depending on whether Ci
is connected to S0 or S1.) The remaining encode queries are handled by encoding the second message
x1, i.e., c
(j) ← Enc(x1).
System Ci maintains a counter j that keeps track of the number of encode queries it has encoun-
tered. When a tamper query (tamper, f) with f ∈ F (j)copy and χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) is received at the
outside interface, it computes f ′1, . . . , f ′n, where
f ′v :=

fv if fv ∈ {zero, one},
zero if fv = copyw for w 6= i, and c(w)v = 0,
one if fv = copyw for w 6= i, and c(w)v = 1,
copy1 if fv = copyi.
Then, it outputs (tamper, f ′) at the inside interface, where f ′ is the function in F (1)copy with χ(f)′ =
(f ′1, . . . , f ′n).19 Let x′ be the answer to the tamper query at the inside interface. Ci computes the
set of indices j for which x′ matches one of the two messages of the jth encode query. Moreover, if
x′ = same, index i is added to that set as well. Then, it outputs (same, j) for the largest index j in
the set. If the set is empty, x′ is output.
One observes that
CiS0 = H
(i) and CiS1 = H
(i−1).
Thus, for all adversaries A,
∆A(S′0,S
′
1) = ∆
A(H(`),H(0)) ≤
∑`
i=1
∆A(H(i),H(i−1))
≤
∑`
i=1
∆A(CiS0,CiS1) ≤
∑`
i=1
∆ACi(S0,S1) ≤ ` · ε.
Proof (of Theorem 2). Follows immediately from Lemmas 16, 17, and 18.
F On the Necessity of Self-Destruct
In this section we show that no (k, n)-coding scheme (Enc,Dec) can achieve (even non-adaptive, i.e.
for ` = 1) continuous non-malleability against Fcopy without self-destruct. This fact is reminiscent of
the negative result by Gennaro et al. [29], and was already observed by Faust et al. [25] (without a
proof) for the easier case of strong continuous non-malleability. The impossibility proof in this section
assumes that Dec is deterministic and that Dec(Enc(x)) = x with probability 1 for all x ∈ {0, 1}k (cf.
Definition 2). The distinguisher D provided by Theorem 19 is universal, i.e., it breaks any coding
scheme (if given oracle access to its decoding algorithm).
For the remainder of this section, let F := Fset (as defined in Section 4), SrealF := SrealF ,1,n, and
SsimuF ,τ := S
simu
F ,τ,1,n (with some simulator τ). Moreover, both S
real
F and S
simu
F ,τ are stripped of the self-
destruct mode.
Theorem 19. There exists a distinguisher D such that for all coding schemes (Enc,Dec) and all
simulators τ ,
∆D(SrealF ,S
simu
F ,τ ) ≥ 1−
n+ 1
2k
.
19For simplicity, we assume here that S0 and S1 answer tamper queries consisting of zero and one instructions only
even before a message has been encoded.
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The corollary below states no pair of converters (encode, decode) can achieve the constructive
statement corresponding to Theorem 1 without relying on the self-destruct feature.
Corollary 20. For any protocol nmc := (encode, decode) and all simulators σ, if both converters are
stateless and
[
1-bit−→•]n ((encode,decode),σ,(0,ε))==⇒ k-bit−→•,
then,
ε ≥ 1− n+ 1
2k
.
Proof. Note that the protocol achieves perfect availability and thus constitutes a perfectly correct
(k, n)-coding scheme (since the converters are stateless and with perfect correctness, decode can w.l.o.g.
be assumed to be deterministic). Consider an arbitrary simulator σ. It can be converted into a
simulator τ as required by Definition 3 in a straight-forward manner. Similarly, there exists a straight-
forward reduction C such that
C(encodeAdecodeB[
1-bit,1,n−→• ]n) ≡ SrealF and C(σE
k-bit,1,n−→• ) ≡ SsimuF ,τ .
Thus, DC achieves advantage 1− n+1
2k
.
F.1 Proof of Theorem 19
Distinguisher D := DExt uses an algorithm Ext that always extracts the encoded message when
interacting with system SrealF and does so with small probability only when interacting with system
SsimuF ,τ (for any simulator).
The Extraction Algorithm. Consider the following algorithm Ext, which repeatedly issues tamper
queries (tamper, f) with f ∈ Fset, expects an answer in {0, 1}k ∪ {, same}, and eventually outputs
a value x′ ∈ {0, 1}k: Initially, it initializes variables f1, . . . , fn ← ∅ (where the value ∅ stands for
“undefined”). Then, for i = 1, . . . , n it proceeds as follows: It queries (tamper, f) with χ(f) =
(f1, . . . , fi−1, zero, keep, . . . , keep). If the answer is same, it sets fi ← zero and otherwise fi ← one. In
the end Ext outputs x′ ← Dec(val(f1) · · · val(fn)).
The Distinguisher. Consider the following distinguisher DExt: Initially, it chooses x ← {0, 1}k
and outputs (encode, x) to the system it is connected to. Then, it lets Ext interact with that system,
replacing an answer by same whenever it is x. When Ext terminates and outputs a value x′, DExt
outputs 1 if x′ = x and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 21. P[DExtS
real
F = 1] = 1.
Proof. Assume that before the ith iteration of Ext, asking the query (tamper, f) with χ(f) = (f1, . . . ,
fi−1, keep, keep, . . . , keep) to SrealF yields the answer x. From this it follows that either (f1, . . . , fi−1, zero,
keep, . . . , keep) or (f1, . . . , fi−1, one, keep, . . . , keep) leads to the answer x; Ext sets fi appropriately
(the fact that the answer x is replaced by same plays no role here). Thus, in the end, computing
Dec(val(f1) · · · val(fn)) yields x.
In other words, Lemma 21 means that Ext always succeeds at recovering the value x chosen by D.
Showing that this happens only with small probability when DExt interacts with S
simu
F ,τ completes the
proof.
Lemma 22. P[DExtS
simu
F ,τ = 1] ≤ n+12k .
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Proof. Consider the following modified distinguisher DˆExt that works as DExt except that it does not
modify the answers received by the system it is connected to. Moreover, let SˆsimuF ,τ be the the system
that ignores all encode-queries and handles queries (tamper, f) by invoking τ(1, f) and outputting τ ’s
answer.
Note that in both experiments, Ext’s view is identical unless it causes τ to output x (the value
encoded by D), which happens with probability at most n
2k
. Thus,
|PDExtSsimuF,τ [Ext outputs x]− PDˆExtSˆsimuF,τ [Ext outputs x]| ≤ n
2k
.
Furthermore, in experiment DˆExtSˆ
simu
F ,τ , Ext’s view is independent of x, and therefore, x is output by
Ext with probability 1
2k
. The claim follows.
G Continuous Non-Malleability against Full Bit-Wise Tampering
In this section we show that the coding scheme by [23] is continuously non-malleable against Fcopy
extended with bit flips. The scheme relies on a LECSS (E,D) (cf. Definition 4 in Section 4) and a
so-called AMD code (A,V); the latter concept was introduced by [14].
Definition 8 (AMD code). A (k, n)-coding scheme (A,V) is a ρ-secure algebraic manipulation detec-
tion (AMD) code if for all x ∈ {0, 1}n and non-zero ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n, P[V(A(x) + ∆) 6= ] ≤ ρ.
The scheme (Enc,Dec) by [23] is the concatenation of an AMD code and a LECSS, i.e., Enc := E◦A
and Dec := V ◦ D, where V() = .
The tampering class Fcopy can be extended to account for bit flips: Let F ′copy := (F ′(i)copy)i≥1 where
F ′(i)copy ⊆ {f | f : ({0, 1}n)i → {0, 1}n} and each function f ∈ F ′(i)copy is characterized by a vector
χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) where fi ∈ {zero, one, copy1, . . . , copyi, flip1, . . . , flipi}, with the meaning that f
takes as input i codewords (c(1), . . . , c(i)) and outputs a codeword c′ = c′1 · · · c′n in which each bit is
either set to 0 (zero), set to 1 (one), copied from the corresponding bit in a codeword c(j) (copyj), or
copied and flipped from the corresponding bit in a codeword c(j) (flipj).
Theorem 23. Let (Enc,Dec) as defined above with a (t, d)-LECSS (k, n)-code for d > n/4 and d > t
and a ρ-secure AMD code. Then (Enc,Dec) is (F ′copy, ε, 1, q)-continuously non-malleable for all q ∈ N
and
ε = 2−(t−1) +
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
+ ρ.
For brevity, we write Fbit for F ′(1)copy below, with the idea that the tampering functions in F ′(1)copy
only allow to keep or flip a bit or to set it to 0 or to 1. More formally, a function f ∈ Fbit can be
characterized by a vector χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) where fi ∈ {zero, one, keep, flip}, with the meaning that
f takes as input a codeword c and outputs a codeword c′ = c′1 · · · c′n in which each bit is either set to
0 (zero), set to 1 (one), left unchanged (keep), or flipped (flip).
For the proof of Theorem 23, fix q ∈ N and some distinguisher D. For the remainder of this
section, let F := Fbit, SrealF := SrealF ,1,q and SsimuF ,τ := SsimuF ,τ,1,q (for a simulator τ to be determined). For
a tamper query f ∈ F with χ(f) = (f1, . . . , fn) issued by D, let A(f) := {i | fi ∈ {zero, one}},
B(f) := {i | fi ∈ {keep, flip}}, and a(f) := |A(f)|. Moreover, let val(zero) := val(keep) := 0 and
val(one) := val(flip) := 1. Queries f with 0 ≤ a(f) ≤ t, t < a(f) < n − t, and n − t ≤ a(f) ≤ n are
called low queries, middle queries, and high queries, respectively.
Dangerous queries. A tamper query is dangerous if it is
• a middle query or
• a low query such that there exists a codeword δ∗ of the LECSS with ∀i ∈ B(f) : δ∗i = val(fi)
and D(δ∗) 6= 0.
32
Consider the hybrid system H that proceeds as SrealF , except that as soon as D specifies a dangerous
query f , H self-destructs, i.e., answers f and all subsequent queries with .
Lemma 24. ∆D(SrealF ,H) ≤ 12t +
(
t
n(d/n−1/4)2
)t/2
+ ρ.
Proof. Define a successful dangerous query to be a dangerous query that does not decode to . On
both systems SrealF and H, one can define an MBO B (cf. Section 2.1) that is provoked if and only if
the first dangerous query is successful and the self-destruct has not been provoked up to that point.
Clearly, SrealF and H behave identically until MBO B is provoked, thus SˆrealF
g≡ Hˆ, and
∆D(SrealF ,H) ≤ ΓD(SˆrealF ).
Towards bounding ΓD(SˆrealF ), note first that adaptivity does not help in provoking B: For any
distinguisher D, there exists a non-adaptive distinguisher D′ with
ΓD(SˆrealF ) ≤ ΓD
′
(SˆrealF ). (8)
D′ proceeds as follows: First, it (internally) interacts with D only. Initially, it stores the message x
output by D internally. Then, it handles the tamper queries f by D as follows:
• Low query: If there exists a codeword δ∗ of the LECSS with ∀i ∈ B(f) : δ∗i = val(fi) and
D(δ∗) = 0, D′ answers with x. Otherwise, D′ stops its interaction with D and sends x and all
the queries to SˆrealF .
• Middle query: D′ stops its interaction with D and sends x and all the queries to SˆrealF .
• High query: If there exists a codeword c∗ that agrees with f in positions i where fi ∈ {zero, one},
D′ answers with Dec(c∗). Otherwise, D′ stops its interaction with D and sends x and all the
queries to SˆrealF .
To prove (8), fix all randomness in experiment D′SrealF , i.e., the coins of D (inside D
′) and the
randomness of the encoding (inside SrealF ). Suppose D would provoke B in the direct interaction with
SrealF . In that case all the answers by D
′ are equal to the answers by SrealF . This is due to the fact that
the distance of the LECSS is d > t; a successful non-dangerous low query must result in the original
message x and a successful high query in Dec(c∗). Thus, whenever D provokes B, D′ provokes it as
well.
It remains to analyze the success probability of non-adaptive distinguishers D′. Fix the coins of
D′; this determines the tamper queries. Suppose there is at least one dangerous query, as otherwise
B is trivially not provoked. The query’s success probability can be analyzed as in [23], depending on
whether it is a low or a high query, which leads to ΓD
′
(SˆrealF ) ≤ 12t +
(
t
n(d/n−1/4)2
)t/2
+ ρ (recall that
the MBO cannot be provoked after an unsuccessful first dangerous query).
Simulator. The final step of the proof consists of exhibiting a simulator τ such that ∆D(H,SsimuF ,τ ) is
small. The indistinguishability proof is facilitated by reusing the two (hardly distinguishable) systems
B and B′ from Section 4 and the wrapper system W defined in Figure 12, such that WB ≡ H and
WB′ ≡ SsimuF ,τ . System W has an outside interface o and an inside interface i; at the latter interface,
W expects to be connected to either B or B′.
Lemma 25. WB ≡ H.
Proof. Fix a message x. Consider a low query f = (f1, . . . , fn). Let c = E(A(x)) be an encoding of x,
set c′ := f(c), and let δ′ := c+ c′. Using the linearity of the LECSS,
D(c′) = D(E(A(x)) + δ′) = A(x) + D(δ′).
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System W
init
∀i ∈ [n] : ci ← ∅
on first (encode, x) at o
output x at i
on (tamper, f) with 0 ≤ a(f) ≤ t at o
for i where fi ∈ B(f)
δ′i ← val(fi)
if ∃codeword δ∗: ∀i ∈ B(f) : δ′i = δ∗i
for i where fi ∈ A(f)
g ← val(fi)⊕ δ∗i
if ci = ∅
output (i, g) at i
get a ∈ {, 1} at i
if a = 
self-destruct
ci ← g
else
if ci 6= g
self-destruct
if D(δ∗) 6= 0
self-destruct
else
output x at o
else
self-destruct
on (tamper, f) with t < a(f) < n− t at o
self-destruct
on (tamper, f) with n− t ≤ a(f) ≤ n at o
for i where fi ∈ A(f)
c′i ← val(fi)
if ∃codeword c∗ : ∀i ∈ A(f) : c′i = c∗i
for i where fi ∈ B(f)
g ← c∗i ⊕ val(fi)
if ci = ∅
output (i, g) at i
get a ∈ {, 1} at i
if a = 
self-destruct
ci ← g
else
if ci 6= g
self-destruct
if Dec(c∗) = 
self-destruct
else
output Dec(c∗) at o
else
self-destruct
Figure 12: The wrapper system W. The command self-destruct causes W to output  at o and to
answer all future queries by .
Therefore, H answers tamper query f by x if D(δ′) = 0 and by  otherwise. In order for δ′ to be equal
to some codeword δ∗ of the LECSS, it is necessary that val(fi) = δ∗i for all i ∈ B(f) and that
ci + c
′
i︸︷︷︸
val(fi)
= δ∗i
for all i ∈ A(f). Note that δ∗, if existent, is unique due to the fact that f is a low query and that the
distance of the LECSS is d > t.
Similarly, for a high query f , there can be at most one codeword that matches the injected positions.
If such a codeword c∗ exists, the outcome is Dec(c∗) if the bits in the keep-positions match c∗, and
otherwise .
By inspection, it can be seen that W acts accordingly.
Consider now the system WB′. Due to the nature of B′, the behavior of WB′ is independent
of the value x that is initially encoded. This allows to easily design a simulator τ as required by
Definition 3. The description of τ is given in Figure 13.
Lemma 26. The simulator τ of Figure 13 satisfies WB′ ≡ SsimuF ,τ .
Proof. Consider the systems WB′ and SsimuF ,τ . Both internally choose a vector of n uniform and
independent bits c = c1 · · · cn. Set c′ := f(c), and let δ′ := c + c′. System WB′ answers low queries
with the value x initially encoded if and only if D(δ′) = 0 and with  otherwise. Simulator τ returns
same in the former case, which SsimuF ,τ replaces by x, and  in the latter case.
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Simulator τ
init
∀i ∈ [n] : ci←$ {0, 1}
on (tamper, f) with 0 ≤ a(f) ≤ t
for i where fi ∈ A(f)
δ′i ← val(fi)⊕ ci
for i where fi ∈ B(f)
δ′i ← val(fi)
δ′ ← δ′1 · · · δ′n
if D(δ′) 6= 0
return 
else
return same
on (tamper, f) with t < a(f) < n− t
return 
on (tamper, f) with n− t ≤ a(f) ≤ n
for i where fi ∈ A(f)
c′i ← val(fi)
for i where fi ∈ B(f)
c′i ← ci ⊕ val(fi)
c′ ← c′1 · · · c′n
return Dec(c′)
Figure 13: Simulator τ .
Observe that the answer by WB′ to a high query f always matches Dec(c′1 · · · c′n), where for
i ∈ A(f), c′i = val(fi), and for i ∈ B(f), c′i = ci ⊕ val(fi): If no codeword c∗ matching the injected
positions exists, then Dec(c′1 · · · c′n) = , which is also what WB′ outputs. If such c∗ exists and
c∗i = ci ⊕ val(fi) for all i ∈ B(f), the output of WB′ is Dec(c′1 · · · c′n). If there exists an i ∈ B(f) with
c∗i 6= ci ⊕ val(fi), WB′ outputs , and in this case Dec(c′1 · · · c′n) =  since the distance of the LECSS
is d > t.
The proof of Theorem 23 now follows from a simple triangle inequality.
Proof (of Theorem 23). From Lemmas 24, 5, 25, and 26, one obtains that for all distinguishers D,
∆D(SrealF ,S
simu
F ,τ ) ≤ ∆D(SrealF ,H) + ∆D(H,WB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ ∆D(WB,WB′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆DW(B,B′)
+ ∆D(WB′,SsimuF ,τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ 2−t +
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
+ ρ+ 2−t
≤ 2−(t−1) +
(
t
n(d/n− 1/4)2
)t/2
+ ρ.
Lemma 27. If (Enc,Dec) is continuously (F ′copy, ε, 1, q)-LOR-non-malleable, it is also continuously
(F ′copy, ` · ε, `, q)-LOR-non-malleable, for all ` ∈ N.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 18, except that the reduction system Ci computes
f ′v as follows:
f ′v :=

fv if fv ∈ {zero, one},
zero if fv = copyw for w 6= i, and c(w)[v] = 0,
one if fv = copyw for w 6= i, and c(w)[v] = 1,
copy1 if fv = copyi,
one if fv = flipw for w 6= i, and c(w)[v] = 0,
zero if fv = flipw for w 6= i, and c(w)[v] = 1,
flip1 if fv = flipi.
35
